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The so-called Johnson Amendment is that portion of Section 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code that prohibits charities from "intervening" in 
electoral campaigns. Intervention has long been understood to include both 
contributing charitable funds to campaign coffers and communicating the 
charity's views about candidates' qualifications for office. The breadth of the 
Johnson Amendment potentially brings two important values into conflict: 
the government's interest in preventing tax-deductible contributions to be 
used for electoral purposes (called “nonsubvention”) and the speech rights 
or interests of charities. 
For many years, the IRS has taken the position that the Johnson 
Amendment's prohibition on electoral communications includes the content 
of a religious leader's speech in an official religious service -- a minister may 
not express support or opposition to a candidate from the pulpit. For at least 
as many years, some commentators and legislators have found this 
application of the Johnson Amendment especially problematic, since it 
implicates directly the freedom of houses of worship speech and religious 
exercise. These Johnson Amendment critics sought to provide some carve-
out from the Johnson Amendment's general application to permit speech that 
includes ministers' pulpit speech without creating a massive loophole for the 
Johnson Amendment's general prohibition on campaign intervention. Other 
commentators have long argued that a limited carve-out for certain types of 
 
* The author is a Professor of Law at American University’s Washington College of Law. 
This article has benefited from discussions over the years with scholars too numerous to 
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speech is not possible—that permitting any communication of the 
organization's views, even in pulpit speech, would provide too large a  loophole 
in the overall treatment of campaign contributions and expenditures. 
This Article reviews the leading proposals to fix the Johnson 
Amendment, and finds them all lacking. It then proposes four types of 
modifications that could be used to properly balance the speech interests of 
charities (including churches) with the government’s interest in a level 
playing field for campaign expenditures (nonsubvention). These proposed 
modifications include: (i) a non-incremental expenditure tax, (ii) a reporting 
regime, (iii) a disclosure regime, and (iv) a governance regime. The Article 
concludes that in order to properly balance nonsubvention with speech 
interests of charities, a modification of the Johnson Amendment should 
include some version of all four types of interventions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a lot of attention to the so-called Johnson Amendment 
lately, and, actually, for a long time. The Johnson Amendment is the portion 
of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that conditions 
qualification for tax-exempt status on an organization refraining from 
participating or intervening in any campaign for public office.1 It is what I 
have previously called the “Campaign Intervention Ban.”2 The Johnson 
Amendment has two very different kinds of effects. First, it levels the 
campaign finance playing field by preventing donors from receiving a tax 
deduction by passing their campaign finance contribution through a 501(c)(3) 
organization when they could not get a tax deduction for a campaign 
contribution in any other context. But, second, it impacts the speech engaged 
in by charities and their leaders, sometimes in ways that arguably have little to 
do with tax-deductible contributions or tax exemption. For example, according 
to guidance from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), it prevents leaders of 
501(c)(3) organizations, including ministers, from indicating a view about 
 
1 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (defining an eligible entity as one “which does not participate in, or 
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on 
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”); see also I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) 
(noting that a “charitable contribution” is one for use of a corporation “which does not 
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”). 
2 Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for Constitutionally 
Enforcing the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673, 675 (2009). In 
the present Article, I use the terms “Johnson Amendment” or “prohibition” to mean the same 
thing as “Campaign Intervention Ban.” 
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which candidate is preferable in any campaign for public office at any official 
function or publication of the organization, including from the pulpit.3  
For a long time, the very specific application of the Johnson 
Amendment to religious leaders’ speech during a worship service has been 
the source of a great deal of the attention, generating strong political 
opposition to the Johnson Amendment’s application in this context. Donald 
Trump repeatedly vowed to “totally destroy” the Johnson Amendment early 
in his presidency4 and appeared to believe he was doing so by issuing an 
executive order on May 4, 2017.5 Legislation to change it has been proposed 
for decades, often targeting violations like the one that would be implicated 
if a minister sought to influence voters from their pulpit.6 Most recently, in 
the 116th Congress, Representative Steve Scalise and Senator James 
Langford introduced The Free Speech Fairness Act of 2019 (FSFA), which 
would cut a narrow(ish) exception to the Johnson Amendment for any 
statement “made in the ordinary course of the organization’s regular and 
customary activities” for which the organization does not incur “more than 
de minimis incremental expenses.”7 The FSFA has never been enacted, but 
on November 16th, 2017, the House passed tax reform legislation (The Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act), which contained a modification of the Johnson 
 
3 See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (stating that leaders of 501(c)(3) organizations, 
such as ministers, “cannot make partisan comments . . . at official functions of the 
organizations.”). 
4 E.g., Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, at 3 (Feb. 
2, 2017). 
5 Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017); see Salvador Rizzo, President 
Trump’s Shifting Claim that ‘We Got Rid’ of the Johnson Amendment, WASH. POST (May 9, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/09/president-trumps-shifting-claim-
that-we-got-rid-johnson-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/38T7-3RTY]) (asserting that Trump 
claimed to dispose of the Johnson Amendment after signing an Executive Order in May 2017 
“with the stated purpose of giving more leeway to religious groups in the realm of political 
speech”); see also Ellen P. Aprill, Amending the Johnson Amendment in the Age of Cheap 
Speech, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–5 (2018) (describing the dissonance between the text 
of the Executive Order and the statements made by President Trump when he signed it); 
Benjamin Leff, Trump’s Johnson Amendment Executive Order Does Not Say What He Said It 
Said, SURLY SUBGROUP BLOG (May 4, 2017), https://surlysubgroup.com/2017/05/04/trumps-
johnson-amendment-executive-order-does-not-say-what-he-said-it-said/ [https://perma.cc/5Q2K-
693U] (detailing the contrast between Trump’s remarks on multiple occasions and the 
potential impacts of the Executive Order).  
6 For a list of bills introduced between 2001 and 2007, see Leff, supra note 2, at 679 n.11. 
Of the nine bills listed there, all but one provides special carveouts for religious organizations 
or houses of worship. See also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, 
Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1141 n.16 (2009) 
(relaying the rejection of the Houses of Worship Political Speech Act and like proposals). 
7 H.R. 949, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). The Bill was introduced by Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA) 
and has 39 co-sponsors. An identical bill was introduced in the Senate by Sen. James 
Lankford (R-OK). See S. 330, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (containing identical provisions). 
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Amendment that is very similar to the FSFA,8 but in the final version of the 
law the provision was removed.9 In addition to reform legislation meant to 
modify but not eradicate the Johnson Amendment, as recently as 2017 
legislation was proposed to repeal the Johnson Amendment entirely.10  
Some citizen activists have sought to effectively repeal the 
prohibition without Congressional action, including a group of ministers who 
have been publicly violating the Johnson Amendment by endorsing 
candidates from their pulpits on what they have been calling “Pulpit Freedom 
Sunday.”11 Many of them then send transcripts or videotapes of their 
violations to the IRS, presumably seeking IRS enforcement that would enable 
them to test the constitutionality of the Johnson Amendment in court, but the 
IRS has to date not made public any enforcement against these groups.12 
Supporters of the Johnson Amendment also have been active and are at 
least as certain of the provision’s importance as its detractors are of its venality.13 
For example, Professor Roger Colinvaux, one of the leading experts on the 
provision, has stated that if Congress passed a bill like the FSFA, relaxing 
but not repealing the Johnson Amendment, “partisan politics would 
overtake the nonprofit world, casting institutions designed to promote the 
 
8 See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 5201 (as passed by the House in amended form, Nov. 16, 2017) 
(proposing to permit a tax-exempt organization to make certain statements related to a 
political campaign without losing its tax-exempt status). 
9 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See Aprill, supra note 5, at 2 n.4 (“The final legislation 
did not include any amendment to the Johnson Amendment. The Democrats persuaded the Senate 
parliamentarian that the amendment of the Johnson Amendment had to be removed from the 
legislation because it violated a provision . . . known as the Byrd Rule.”) (citation omitted).  
10 H.R. 172, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017).  
11 See Pulpit Initiative | Pulpit Freedom Sunday, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Feb. 5, 
2019), http://www.adfmedia.org/news/prdetail/4360 [perma.cc/GSU3-3Y97] (“Pulpit 
Freedom Sunday is an event associated with the Pulpit Initiative, a legal effort designed to 
secure the free speech rights of pastors in the pulpit.”). For a discussion of Pulpit Freedom 
Sunday, see Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning 
Prohibition. Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 145 (2016). 
12 Between 2004 and 2008 the IRS ran the Political Activity Compliance Initiative (PACI), 
which sought to investigate violations of the Johnson Amendment and to use the 
investigations to educate the public about its limits. But, since then, the IRS has been silent 
about such violations. See, e.g., Memorandum from Michael R. Phillips, Deputy Inspector 
General for Audit, to Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division, 
Improvements Have Been Made to Educate Tax-Exempt Organizations and Enforce the 
Prohibition Against Political Activities, but Further Improvements Are Possible (June 18, 
2008), (available at https://www.treasury.gov/Tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200810117fr.html 
[https:// perma.cc/Y22P-JYHF]) (providing no mention of Johnson Amendment violations).  
13 See, e.g., Brendan Fischer, Destroying the Johnson Amendment: How Allowing Charities 
to Spend on Politics Would Flood the Swamp That President Trump Promised to Drain, 
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (May 3, 2017), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/John 
son%20Amendment%20White%20Paper_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q23Y-VKW3] (highlighting 
the arguments against letting 501(c)(3) non-profits participate in political campaign activities). 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [Nov. 2020 
 
   
 
120 
public good into the depraved den of identity politics and selfish motives.”14 
He predicts “devastating results for charities and democracy” and calls this 
“a seismic moment.”15  
The remarkable thing about the partisan divide over the Johnson 
Amendment is that while the rhetoric is extreme, it is not clear that the 
distance between the camps is very far apart. As mentioned above, the 
Johnson Amendment arguably does two distinct things: (i) first, it prevents 
political contributors from using charities to obtain a tax deduction for their 
political campaign contributions, a deduction that is not available under 
(almost) any other circumstance. Almost everyone (even Senator Charles 
Grassley, a voluble Johnson Amendment critic) agrees that it would be a bad 
idea to permit political campaign contributions to flow through charities, 
permitting donors a tax deduction that they would not be able to get if they 
supported candidates in any other way.16 This goal of the Johnson 
Amendment is sometimes called the “nonsubvention principle”17 because it 
prevents 501(c)(3) organizations from using the government subsidy implicit 
in tax exemption and tax-deductible charitable contributions for electoral 
purposes. There is widespread consensus that this aspect of the Johnson 
 
14 Roger Colinvaux, Opinion, The House Tax Bill Could Be the End of Charities as We Know 
Them, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/ 
the-house-tax-bill-could-be-the-end-of-charities-as-we-know-them/ [https://perma.cc/9SSD-
KRMR]; see also E-mail from Milton Cerny, Esq., to Paul Streckfus, Editor, EO Tax Journal 
(Jul. 25, 2016), in Paul Streckfus, The EOTJ Mailbag, EO TAX J. 2016-142 (“[O]nce you 
allow charities to engage in political campaigns you create a cancer on the sector.”). 
15 Colinvaux, supra note 14. See also Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want to Develop 
Rules Regarding Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 652 (2012) (noting 
that, without the additional threat of revocation of 501(c)(3) status, an excise tax would not 
effectively deter an organization from engaging in political campaign intervention if this 
intervention required little out-of-pocket expense); Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech 
of Charities in the Face of Citizens United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 685, 756 (2012) (stressing that the benefits of loosening the prohibition on political 
intervention are not obvious, while the benefits of retaining the prohibition—specifically, “a 
charitable sector that is noble in purpose and free of partisan rancor”—are evident). 
16 Senator Grassley reportedly said, “There was some indication in the press, I don’t know 
whether it’s the way the Johnson Amendment actually works so give me this leeway, but if it 
allows the use of church contributions to promote candidates, I think that goes too far.” Senator 
Charles Grassley, Remarks at the Floyd County Courthouse (Feb. 23, 2017), in Paul Streckfus, 
FFRF Argues for Retention of Johnson Amendment, EO TAX J. 2017-97 (May 17, 2017). 
17 This principle is explained (without using the term “subvention”) in Regan v. Taxation 
With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (“We have held in several 
contexts that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does 
not infringe the right . . . .”). See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 5, at 10 (“[T]he ‘no duty to pay’ 
rationale [is] often dubbed the nonsubvention principle . . . .”). 
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Amendment should be preserved.18 But, (ii) second, the Johnson Amendment 
also prevents charities from expressing their own views on the qualifications 
of candidates for office, and leaders of charities from expressing their 
personal views under circumstances in which these views could be attributed 
to the organization. Both spending or donating money and expressing the 
organization’s view are considered “political campaign activity” by the 
IRS.19 It is this second effect of the Johnson Amendment that is causing the 
partisan divide, since some commentators (mainly on the political right) 
believe that this component of the Johnson Amendment infringes on the 
speech rights of charitable actors, especially religious leaders speaking to 
their own congregations.20 
A few quick examples might be helpful to understand the difference 
between the nonsubvention principle, which almost everyone wants to 
maintain, and the free speech and exercise values that Johnson Amendment 
critics want to foster. If Ben Leff, who is so rich that he is in the top federal 
income tax bracket of 37% in 2020, wants to support a candidate for 
president, he can contribute to the candidate’s campaign, which under current 
law has no effect on his taxable income. Or, if there was no Johnson 
Amendment, he could contribute $1,000 to the charity of his choice (for 
example, the Benjamin Leff Donor-Advised Fund at Vanguard Charitable, a 
501(c)(3) charity), and then the charity could contribute the funds to the 
candidate. Leff would take a deduction of the $1,000 charitable contribution 
 
18 See, e.g., COMM’N ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POL’Y FOR RELIGIOUS ORG., GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION OF POLITICAL SPEECH BY RELIGIOUS AND OTHER 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS: 
WHY THE STATUS QUO IS UNTENABLE AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 5 (2013) [hereinafter 
CAPRO REPORT] (“[T]here is a high level of agreement among Commission and Panel 
members that permitting the disbursement of funds by tax-exempt religious and other 
501(c)(3) organizations for political campaign activities could have a deleterious impact on 
the effectiveness of the nonprofit sector.”).  
19 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 11283J, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN 
OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 69 (2019) (“All activities that support or 
oppose candidates for elective federal, state, or local public office. It doesn’t matter whether 
the candidate is elected. A candidate is one who offers himself or is proposed by others for 
public office. Political campaign activity doesn’t include any activity to encourage 
participation in the electoral process, such as voter registration or voter education, provided 
that the activity doesn’t directly or indirectly support or oppose any candidate.”). 
20 See, e.g., CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 4 (“[A] member of the clergy should be 
permitted to say whatever he or she believes is appropriate in the context of a religious 
worship service without fear of government reprisal, even when such communications 
include content related to political candidates.”); see also E-mail from Mike Batts, Managing 
Partner, Batts Morrison Wales & Lee, to Paul Streckfus, Editor, EO Tax Journal (Jul. 27, 
2016), in Paul Streckfus, The EOTJ Mailbag, EO TAX J. 2016-144 (“The content of a sermon 
or religious worship service embodies these [core First Amendment] rights like virtually 
nothing else . . . . A law that permits US government officials to monitor and evaluate the 
content of a minister’s sermons to determine whether such content is permissible is inherently 
problematic. It is hard to imagine any law that is more of an affront to the First Amendment.”). 
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(reducing his taxes by $370), and his out-of-pocket cost for his $1,000 
contribution would be only $630; the candidate would get the full $1,000. 
The $370 savings is “subvention,” because the US government effectively 
subsidizes Leff’s political contribution by permitting Leff to reduce his taxes 
by making a charitable contribution that is then used to support his candidate. 
A million-dollar contribution gives him $370,000 worth of “subvention.” 
Even without subvention, our campaign finance laws permit billionaires to 
exert an impressive amount of influence over our elections. Permitting 
subvention—a subsidy from the federal government supplementing their 
donations—would distort the campaign finance playing field even more.  
If, rather than pass the $1,000 contribution on to a candidate, the 
charity uses the money to buy its own advertisement in a newspaper that says 
“vote for candidate X” (the candidate Leff supports), it is clear that there is 
still “subvention” because the cost of campaign-related speech is subsidized 
by the charitable deduction. But what if we imagine a charitable leader 
speaking at a regular meeting of their organization, like a minister preaching 
at a church worship service? Here, no “incremental funds” are spent on the 
speech because the leader would be speaking to the community at that time 
even if they weren’t speaking about a candidate. In that case, it might appear 
that there is no subvention, or at least that subvention is not a serious concern 
in light of the value of the speech of charities, especially churches. Under 
current law, charities are prohibited from engaging in a wide range of 
activities that might communicate their or their donors’ views with respect to 
a candidate regardless of whether they incur incremental costs.21 In effect, 
the law holds that a charity cannot support or oppose a candidate, even if no 
incremental funds are used to communicate their support or opposition. It is 
this interpretation of the Johnson Amendment that some scholars, activists,22 
and lawmakers23 oppose. They would like to relax the Johnson Amendment 
so charities could have views about the qualifications of candidates and could 
communicate those views under certain limited circumstances. Almost all 
critics still support the nonsubvention principle; they just want the Johnson 
Amendment to permit a charity to have and communicate a view about the 
qualifications of candidates for office. Some scholars have made compromise 
 
21 See infra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
22 For example, Erik Stanley, the architect of the Pulpit Freedom Sunday protest movement, 
proclaimed support for the FSFA. See Erik Stanley, Opinion, How to Fix the Johnson 
Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-fix-
the-johnson-amendment-1486686394 [https://perma.cc/D22S-FZNF] (arguing that the FSFA 
fixes the Johnson Amendment’s constitutional problems). 
23 See H.R. 949, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2019) (allowing an organization to make a statement 
favoring or opposing a candidate for public office without losing its 501(c)(3) status if that 
statement is “made in the ordinary course of the organization’s regular and customary activities 
[and] results in the organization incurring not more than de minimis incremental expenses.”). 
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proposals because they think that it is wrong for the IRS to prevent church 
leaders from expressing views on candidates in worship services;24 others 
have proposed compromise solutions because they think that some relaxation 
of the Johnson Amendment is politically likely, and they would like to 
minimize the damage done.25 
Compromise legislation and academic proposals attempt to permit 
some communications about candidates without opening the floodgates on 
all political contributions. The problem is, it is very hard to conceive of how 
to permit enough speech to satisfy the critics who want more autonomy for 
charities and their leaders without opening the floodgates to widespread 
political influence, especially in an age in which so much partisan electoral 
speech occurs on the internet and in social media, where the incremental 
costs of such speech may be very low. For the Johnson Amendment’s 
supporters therefore, these compromises threaten the charitable sector at its 
very core. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether there could be a 
compromise solution that recognizes the speech rights of charities while 
simultaneously going farther than incrementalist solutions, like the FSFA, to 
vindicate the nonsubvention principle. 
This paper proceeds in four parts. First, it introduces the Johnson 
Amendment and the current IRS guidance that pertains to organizational 
leaders expressing views on the qualifications of candidates, especially 
ministers expressing their views on candidates from their pulpits. Second, it 
explores two types of existing proposed compromises—(i) de minimis 
incremental expenditure proposals, and (ii) a variety of more speech-
restrictive proposals. Third, it explores the constitutional argument against 
the current Johnson Amendment, describes the minimum characteristics any 
 
24 See, e.g., NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: 
PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 326 (2011) (advocating for an approach that 
seeks to “lessen federal governmental restriction of political speech and intrusion into 
religion by diminishing the IRS’s role as monitor and arbiter of the content of speech of 
houses of worship . . . .”); EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH: RELIGION, 
EXEMPTIONS, ENTANGLEMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 194 (2017) (arguing that the IRS 
infringes on religious bodies’ exercise of autonomy and freedom when it monitors and 
assesses internal church communications).  
25 See Aprill, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that amending the Johnson Amendment to provide 
a de minimis exception for incremental expenses—a proposal that has continued support in 
Congress—would eliminate the guards that prevent tax-free dollars from funding political 
campaigns); cf. Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty 
to Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 159–68 (2011) (proposing 
that Congress implement a penalty that could be imposed on tax-exempt organization as a 
means of “discouraging public charities from participating in political campaigns and 
improving the IRS’s ability to enforce the prohibition.”); Colinvaux, supra note 14 (positing 
that enacting the proposed changes to the Johnson Amendment contained in the tax bill 
would “cast[] institutions designed to promote the general good into the depraved den of 
identity politics and selfish motives.”). 
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proposal must have to pass constitutional muster, and evaluates the current 
proposals from a constitutional lens. Fourth, it proposes a variety of types of 
possible legislation that I argue would do a better job of balancing the 
competing interests at play, including non-incremental expenditure taxes, and 
reporting, disclosure, and governance requirements. 
 
I.  THE JOHNSON AMENDMENT’S APPLICATION TO MINISTERS’ PULPIT 
SPEECH 
 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code describes the 
qualifications that must be met for an organization to be tax-exempt under 
that subsection. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are notable not only because 
their income is exempt from the corporate income tax, but also donations may 
be made to them on a tax-deductible basis.26 Other organizations, including 
those organizations that are expressly devoted to party politics, are exempt 
from income tax, but may not receive deductible contributions. The so-called 
Johnson Amendment is that portion of section 501(c)(3) that requires 
501(c)(3) organizations to refrain from engaging in campaign-related 
activities. In its entirety, the Johnson Amendment states: “[an organization is 
exempt provided it] does not participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of 
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”27 
The penalty for violation of the Johnson Amendment is revocation of 
tax-exempt status, because an organization that engages in political campaign 
activity has not met the requirements set out in section 501(c)(3).28 However, 
in addition to revocation, Congress has provided an excise tax that applies to 
 
26 See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (“[T]he term ‘charitable contribution’ means a contribution or 
gift to or for the use of . . . a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . 
which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) . . . .”). 
27 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Identical language appears in I.R.C. § 170, related to the deductibility 
of charitable contributions. Id. § 170(c)(2)(D) (“[W]hich does not participate in or intervene 
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf 
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”). 
28 See I.R.C. 501(c)(3) (detailing that, to qualify for exemption, an organization must not 
“participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) 
any candidate for public office.”).  
Vol. 6:1]         Fixing the Johnson Amendment  
 
 
125 
political expenditures.29 These excise taxes can be applied to supplement 
revocation, or to replace revocation in cases in which revocation is not required.30 
The Treasury Regulations that pertain to the Johnson Amendment are 
distressingly succinct,31 but there is official guidance from the IRS that is 
very informative. In 2007, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2007-41, which 
describes in detail the IRS’s interpretation of the meaning and scope of the 
Johnson Amendment.32 Because there is so much confusion about the scope 
of the Johnson Amendment, it is important to emphasize some of the 
things that Rev. Rul. 2007-41 makes clear that the Johnson Amendment 
does not do. It does not prevent ministers (or other organizational leaders) 
from speaking about politically-charged issues like abortion, sexuality, 
public schooling, and religious freedom.33 It does not prevent churches (or 
other organizations) from having official views about these issues (so-
called “issue advocacy”). It does not prevent organizations from inviting 
candidates to speak at their meetings, including from their pulpits, as long as 
the organization does not favor one candidate over others.34 It does not 
prevent ministers (or other organizational leaders) from communicating their 
personal views on the qualifications of candidates or even endorsing a 
candidate, as long as they don’t do so in official meetings or publications of 
the organization.35 And, if it is even necessary to say this, it does not impose  
criminal penalties on anyone no matter what they say or do.36  
So, what then does the Johnson Amendment do? At least one 
important purpose of the Johnson Amendment is to prevent the use of tax-
 
29 See id. § 4955(a)(1) (imposing an initial excise tax of 10% of any “political expenditure.”); 
id. § 4955(a)(2) (imposing an additional tax of 2.5% of the political expenditure on each 
manager who approved the expenditure); id. § 4955(b)(1) (providing that an organization 
that does not correct the expenditure must pay a tax of 100% of the expenditure); id. § 
4955(f)(3) (explaining that an organization that corrects the political expenditure by 
“recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, [and] 
establish[ing] safeguards to prevent future expenditures . . . .”).   
30 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(a) (1995) (detailing that, “the excise taxes imposed by section 
4955 do not affect the substantive standards for tax exception under section 501(c)(3), under 
which an organization is described in section 501(c)(3) only if it does not participate or 
intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.”).  
31 See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3), discussed infra at note 40 (describing the factors that determine 
that an organization is “not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes . . . .”); see 
also id. § 53.4955-1 (discussing the excise taxes imposed on political expenditures). 
32 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
33 See id. (discussing permissible “issue advocacy”). 
34 See id. (discussing permissible “candidate appearances”). 
35 See id. (discussing permissible “individual activity by organization leaders”). 
36 See Remarks by Sen. Charles Grassley, supra note 16 (“What I want to make sure is that 
this minister, or any other minister, can’t be jailed just because she makes a political 
statement—within—from the pulpit. That’s what I think the Johnson Amendment restricts, 
and it violates freedom of speech and freedom of religion . . . .”). 
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deductible money in political campaigns.37 If a contribution is made on a tax-
deductible basis to a 501(c)(3) organization, which is then contributed to a 
campaign or spent on campaign-intervention activities, the playing field is 
not level with respect to contributions or expenditures for campaign 
activities. Individuals, political organizations, and business corporations get 
no deduction for contributing to or spending on campaign activities, but any 
contribution made to a 501(c)(3) organization that is then contributed or spent 
for partisan electoral speech does effectively get a deduction. Thus, the 
Johnson Amendment prevents a distortion of the campaign funding system by 
preventing campaign spending by 501(c)(3) organizations, thereby requiring 
all contributions and expenditures to be made on a nondeductible basis.38 
The second effect of the Johnson Amendment, at least as interpreted 
by the IRS, not only prevents the contribution or expenditure of funds, but 
also prevents exempt organizations from using their “voice” to communicate 
a preference for a candidate. The simplest version of this use of their voice 
would be an official endorsement—something like a press release from the 
Board of Directors of an exempt organization that the organization supports 
candidate X in an upcoming political campaign. According to the IRS, this 
communication would violate the Johnson Amendment. But it is not only 
express endorsements that violate the Johnson Amendment, according to the 
IRS. Any communication reasonably attributed to the organization that shows 
a preference among candidates is forbidden. Among other things, according 
to the IRS, a 501(c)(3) organization violates the Johnson Amendment when 
an organizational leader—including a minister—expresses views about a 
candidate during an official meeting—including a worship service—or in a 
publication of the organization.39 
The logic behind this prohibition is sound in two ways. First, 
obviously, the statute itself does not say that an organization is prohibited 
from using its money to intervene in a campaign; it says that an organization 
is prohibited from intervening. The plain meaning of “intervene” plausibly 
includes telling people what you think. Furthermore, the statute expressly 
prohibits “the publishing or distributing of statements[.]”40 While neither 
“publishing” nor “distributing” is the same as “speaking,” it is fair to read the 
statutory language as prohibiting the organization from communicating its 
 
37 See Leff, supra note 2, at 676 n.4 (calling the nonsubvention principle “the only coherent 
justification for the ban”). 
38 See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 15, at 673 (“[A] more persuasive justification for the 
prohibition is that Congress did not wish to allow tax-deductible contributions to be used for 
political campaign intervention.”).  
39 See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (explaining that a minister making an endorsement 
at an official church function would violate the political campaign intervention prohibition). 
40 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
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preferences through any means.41 This interpretation is strengthened by 
Treasury Regulations, which expand on the statutory language by defining 
campaign-intervention activities as including “the publication or distribution 
of written or printed statements or the making of oral statements on behalf of 
or in opposition to such a candidate.”42  
Second, one might argue that any time an organization communicates 
its preference for a candidate, it is using its funds.43 It used its funds literally 
to build (or pay for) the location at which it holds its official functions; it used 
its funds to attract its members who now are present at the official function; 
and it used its funds to build the credibility that gives its endorsement (or 
other intervention speech) its authority.44 It did all those things over some 
period of time using funds it had collected on a tax-deductible basis. Thus, in 
a very real sense the organization is spending money on the communication, 
even if no incremental funds are expended in the present for the specific 
speech act. There is nothing irrational or even erroneous about the IRS’s 
interpretation. It is arguably the best plain-meaning interpretation of the 
words and intent of the statutory language. 
The most controversial kind of implied endorsement is when an 
organizational leader, especially a church leader, speaks at an official 
function or in an official publication.45 Rev. Rul. 2007-41 creates a per se 
rule that any such speech should be attributed to the organization rather than 
to the organizational leader as an individual, and therefore this speech 
violates the Johnson Amendment whenever it communicates a preference 
among candidates.46 Opposition to the Johnson Amendment (except when 
merely confused about its scope) has generally focused on the following 
 
41 It arguably would also be fair to read the statutory language in a limiting way, to argue 
that Congress intended only to prohibit actions that spread the organization’s opinion on 
candidates to the general public, as through “publishing” or “distributing” their views. See 
discussion infra Section III.A (describing Branch Ministries, which involved a 501(c)(3) 
church purchasing an advertisement opposing Bill Clinton in a national publication). Under 
this interpretation, an internal communication, like one from a pastor (or other organizational 
leader) speaking at a church service (or other official function) would not constitute 
campaign intervention. 
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) (1995) (as amended in 2017) (emphasis added). 
43 I have made this argument in detail previously. See Leff, supra note 2, at 707–15 
(explaining how a 501(c)(3) organization can use subsidized funds to support its campaign-
intervention activities without making a marginal expenditure). 
44 See id. at 711–15 (arguing that, regardless of whether campaign intervention directly 
utilizes subsidized funds, subsidized funds strengthen the organization and thereby enhance 
the impact of the organization’s statements). 
45 A variety of scholars, activists, and legislators believe that religious leaders should be 
permitted to say whatever they want at worship services. See, e.g., Stanley, supra note 22 
(endorsing the FSFA as a measure that will remove the Johnson Amendment’s unconstitutional 
restrictions on free speech and allow charities to participate in political speech). 
46 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421–23. 
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scenario: a minister (organizational leader) wishes to express their views 
about the qualifications of a candidate from the pulpit (official function) 
based on the values of the organization, but has been prevented from doing 
so for fear that such communication would constitute an implied endorsement 
and therefore a violation of the Johnson Amendment.47 Rev. Rul. 2007-41 
supports the view that a communication like the one imagined would indeed 
violate the Johnson Amendment and so warrant enforcement action by the 
IRS.48  
 
II. EXISTING PROPOSED COMPROMISES 
 
As discussed above, there is general consensus among scholars that 
the Johnson Amendment plays an essential role by preventing a loophole in 
the tax treatment of campaign finance.49 Because funders of political 
campaigns do not generally receive a tax deduction for their campaign-related 
expenditures, a complete repeal of the Johnson Amendment would permit 
them to circumvent this rule by donating on a tax-deductible basis to 
501(c)(3) organizations, which could then funnel their donations to a 
campaign, support independent organizations that advocate for candidates, or 
spend the donations to advocate for candidates themselves. There is 
widespread concern that a complete repeal of the Johnson Amendment would 
fundamentally transform the campaign finance system, permitting deductions 
for political contributions as long as they were funneled through charities.50   
However, there are numerous critics of the Johnson Amendment who argue 
that the provision could be modified to permit 501(c)(3) organizations (or at 
least churches) to vindicate their free speech interests (or those of their 
leaders) without opening the door to a massive loophole that dramatically 
drags 501(c)(3) organizations into the electoral process as conduits for 
 
47 See discussion infra Section II. 
48 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS 7–9 (2009) (prohibiting 501(c)(3) organizations from political campaign 
activity on behalf of candidates running for elected office); see also INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BAN ON POLITICAL CAMPAIGN 
INTERVENTION BY 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (2020), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/charitable-organizations/frequently-asked-questions-about-the-ban-on-political-cam 
paign-intervention-by-501c3-organizations-organization-position-on-issues [https://perma.cc/ 
GVT2-KBJD] (explaining the rule regarding 501(c)(3) organizations stating positions on 
public policy issues).  
49 See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s 
Knot, 34 VA. TAX REV. 1, 19–20 (2014) (defending the importance of the political activities 
prohibition); Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: 
Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1339–41 (2007) 
(outlining the risks of 501(c)(3) organizations intervening in political campaigns). 
50 See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 14 (explaining the concern that repealing the Johnson 
Amendment might put charitable organizations and democracy at risk). 
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campaign finance.51 Many of the proposals to modify the Johnson 
Amendment seek to expand the scope of permissible speech to permit 
discussion of candidates’ qualifications by an organizational leader, although 
the focus is generally the speech of a religious leader from the pulpit or 
equivalent place of authority in their house of worship.52  
For many critics, the key to striking the right balance between speech 
rights and disruption of the electoral process is distinguishing between what 
I previously have called an “expenditure paradigm” and an “attribution 
paradigm.”53 Under an expenditure paradigm, the point of regulating 
electoral speech by charities is to avoid the government subsidizing such 
speech through the deductibility of charitable contributions (or the exemption 
of charitable earnings).54 Under an attribution paradigm, the point of 
regulating electoral speech by charities is pretty much anything else: any 
argument that electoral speech by charities is dangerous whether or not it 
misuses a governmental subsidy delivered through the tax code.55 The more 
permissive proposals to modify the Johnson Amendment seek to permit 
electoral speech that could be attributed to the charity while simultaneously 
trying to eliminate or minimize abuse of the tax subsidies by widespread use 
of charitable expenditures. Other proposals seek to go further. 
 
A. De Minimis Incremental Expenditure Solutions 
 
De minimis incremental expenditure proposals focus on the 
expenditures associated with any partisan electoral speech and permit such 
speech if the incremental cost of such speech is very low or nonexistent. For 
example, the Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious 
Organizations (CAPRO) produced a compromise policy proposal56 that is an 
example of the attempt to permit more robust electoral speech by charities 
 
51 See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign 
Activity by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1095–1107 (2007) 
(proposing a narrower set of reforms to replace the Johnson Amendment); Laura Brown 
Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
308, 315 (1990) (explaining Constitutional concerns about the Johnson Amendment and 
proposing reforms to address those concerns); Alan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When 
Churches Participate in Political Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 151–52 (2007) 
(advocating for treating churches differently than other kinds of charitable organizations with 
regards to political activities).  
52 See, e.g., ZELINSKY, supra note 24, at 201–06 (proposing a solution that only applies to 
houses of worship); CRIMM & WINER, supra note 24, at 336–37 (discussing a proposed 
solution in the context of houses of worship). 
53 See Leff, supra note 2, at 696. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 28. 
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(especially churches) while still preventing charities from expending funds 
for electoral purposes, because permitting such expenditures “would amount 
to a subsidy of such activity by the taxpayers . . . .”57 CAPRO was created by 
the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (“ECFA”) at the request 
of Republican Senator Charles Grassley, whose staff had produced a report 
that identified the Johnson Amendment as one of several federal laws that 
negatively impacted religious organizations.58 CAPRO consisted of a broad 
array of “commissioners” with experience in the nonprofit (and especially 
religious) community, and was advised by several advisory panels with more 
specific expertise.59 Its report acknowledged that the Johnson Amendment 
should not be repealed because it serves an important purpose of “prohibiting 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations from expending funds for political 
campaign-related activities.”60 It reported that “[t]here is a high level of 
agreement among the Commission and Panel members that permitting the 
disbursement of funds by religious and other 501(c)(3) organizations for 
political campaign activities would likely have a deleterious impact on the 
effectiveness and credibility of the nonprofit sector.”61 On the other hand, the 
report was also clear that “there is much accord among the members of the 
Commission and its Panel . . . that a member of the clergy should be permitted 
to say whatever he or she believes is appropriate in the context of a religious 
worship service without fear of government reprisal, even when such 
communications include content related to political candidates.”62  
 In order to “strike a necessary balance” between advancing the liberty 
interests of charities and preventing the expenditure of tax deductible funds 
on electoral speech, CAPRO proposed that the Johnson Amendment be 
interpreted to permit “a communication related to one or more political 
candidates or campaigns that is made in the ordinary course of a 501(c)(3) 
organization’s regular and customary religious, charitable, educational, 
scientific, or other exempt-purpose activities . . . so long as the organization 
does not incur more than de minimis incremental costs with respect to the 
communication (that is, the organization’s costs would not have been different 
 
57 E-mail from Mike Batts, Managing Partner, Batts Morrison Wales & Lee, to Paul 
Streckfus, Editor, EO Tax Journal (Jul. 27, 2016), in Paul Streckfus, The EOTJ Mailbag, EO 
TAX J. 2016-144 (“Some argue that since contributions to (c)(3)s are tax deductible, allowing 
(c)(3)s to engage in political activity would amount to a subsidy of such activity by the 
taxpayers . . . and as a matter of tax policy, that is a no-go.”); he also described the 
compromise as “The Commission addressed this issue specifically by offering an elegant, if 
not perfect, solution of permitting ‘no cost political communications.’”).  
58 CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 4. 
59 See id. at 61–88 (listing short biographies of commissioners and advisory panel members). 
60 Id. at 27. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 4, 28.  
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by any significant amount had the communication not occurred).”63 The report 
calls this type of communication a “no-cost political communication.”64   
For many years, congressional Republicans have proposed legislation 
to eliminate or curtail the Johnson Amendment. The current proposed 
legislation with the most support among congressional Republicans is the 
Free Speech Fairness Act of 2019 (FSFA),65 which is explicitly modeled on 
the CAPRO proposal. That bill expressly amends section 501 of the Internal 
Revenue Code to make clear that:  
[A]n organization . . . shall [not] be deemed to have 
participated in, or intervened in any political campaign on 
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office, 
solely because of the content of any statement which— 
“(A) is made in the ordinary course of the 
organization’s regular and customary activities in 
carrying out its exempt purpose, and  
“(B) results in the organization incurring not more 
than de minimis incremental expenses.”66   
The FSFA therefore expressly adopts a de minimis incremental 
expenditure approach to modifying the Johnson Amendment, which permits 
all “no-cost political communications” while still prohibiting the expenditure 
of greater sums by a 501(c)(3) organization to engage in partisan political 
speech. It is an attempt to more fully recognize the speech (or free exercise) 
interests of charities while at least attempting to prevent a complete 
transformation of the campaign finance system. 
Even Erik Stanley, the architect of Pulpit Freedom Sunday, who 
vigorously argues that the Johnson Amendment is unconstitutional root and 
branch,67 supports the compromise approach of the FSFA, arguing that “[t]he 
Free Speech Fairness Act . . . fixes the law’s constitutional problems . . . . [It] 
would get the IRS out of the speech-police business while prohibiting 
political expenditures or contributions by tax-exempt organizations.”68 
 
63 Id. at 28. 
64 Id. 
65 H.R. 949, 116th Cong. (2019). 
66 Id. § 2(a). The Bill applies this definition to sections 501(c)(3), 170 (deduction for 
charitable contributions), 2055 (exemption from estate tax), 2106 (exemption from estate 
tax), 2522 (exemption from gift tax), and 4955 (excise taxes on political expenditures by 
501(c)(3) organizations), and so there would be no excise taxes or other impediment to an 
organization acting in the ways sanctioned by the Bill.  
67 See Erik W. Stanley, LBJ, the IRS, and Churches: The Unconstitutionality of the Johnson 
Amendment in Light of Recent Supreme Court Precedent, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 237, 240 
(2012) (arguing that the Johnson Amendment violates the Free Speech and Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment). 
68 Stanley, supra note 22. 
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Thus, the leading compromise proposal coming from conservatives 
adopts an approach in which “no-cost political communication” is permitted 
for 501(c)(3) organizations, but any use of “subsidized” funds is prohibited. 
Indeed, this bifurcation of speech into “no-cost” and “subsidized” speech is 
the most obvious solution to the constitutional problem posed by the Johnson 
Amendment and the Supreme Court jurisprudence on tax provisions that limit 
speech. Under this analysis, the government is free to provide “subsidies” 
(including beneficial tax provisions like the charitable exemption and 
deductibility of charitable contributions) for activities that do not include 
engaging in political speech. This is the so-called “nonsubvention” principle: 
that the government’s choice not to subsidize political speech is not a 
“burden” on a person’s (or organization’s) speech rights, and so the 
government does not have to justify that choice under any kind of heightened 
constitutional scrutiny.69 Under this analysis, there is no burden on speech if 
the government permits charitable tax status under the condition that the 
financial benefits of such status are not used for political speech. But scholars 
and courts have generally understood that the government is not permitted to 
provide tax subsidies on the condition that the recipient forego their right to 
engage in such speech using their own funds.70 The Supreme Court has held 
that in order to avoid burdening the speech of the recipient of a government 
benefit, the government must permit some “alternate means” that the 
recipient may use to engage in political speech.71 In the leading case on tax 
subsidies for 501(c)(3) organizations (which held that the limits on lobbying 
by 501(c)(3) organizations were constitutional) that alternate means was 
understood to be the use of an affiliated 501(c)(4) organization, which is 
permitted to engage in unlimited lobbying.72 Therefore, the constitutional 
jurisprudence encourages a focus on expenditures in drawing the line 
 
69 See Regan v. Tax’n With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (“We have 
held in several contexts that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a 
fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”). 
70 For a discussion of the so-called “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine’s application to 
speech-related conditions on government-provided benefits to nonprofit organizations, see, 
e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 46 CONN. 
L. REV. 1045, 1048 (2014) (articulating the article’s “goal of bringing clarity to . . . speech-
related conditions on government-provided benefits to nonprofit organizations.”). The 
doctrine was reaffirmed in a recent Supreme Court opinion (albeit in dissent). See Agency 
for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2092 (2020) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“Congress may not, however, ‘leverage funding to regulate speech outside the 
contours’ of the program it has chosen to subsidize.”) (quoting Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. 
for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2013)).  
71 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 544 (“It also appears that TWR can obtain tax deductible 
contributions for its nonlobbying activity by returning to the dual structure it used in the past, 
with a § 501(c)(3) organization for nonlobbying activities and a § 501(c)(4) organization for 
lobbying.”). 
72 Id. 
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between nonsubvention (which is constitutionally unproblematic) and 
requiring the recipient to forego or limit political speech (which would 
presumably be a burden that would need to be justified by heightened or even 
strict scrutiny). It is not surprising, then, that a compromise proposal 
regarding the Johnson Amendment would attempt to permit “no-cost political 
communication,” since the absence of any cost negates the government’s 
purpose in restricting political speech by tax subsidy recipients. In effect, 
engaging in “no-cost political communication” should function as well as any 
other alternate means of communicating the recipient’s own political views.  
Several years ago, I made my first attempt to propose a 
constitutionally appropriate application of the Johnson Amendment that 
balanced speech rights against the nonsubvention principle.73 I argued that 
the IRS’s interpretation of the provision (as described in Revenue Ruling 
2007-41) was too restrictive of the speech of 501(c)(3) organizations because 
it did not permit any alternate means for communicating the organization’s 
own views on candidates.74 At the same time, I pointed out that 
nonsubvention is more complicated than it might at first seem. I argued that 
two types of then-current proposals, de minimis proposals and “marginal 
cost” proposals, insufficiently take into account the expenditure of subsidized 
funds that bolster or benefit an organization’s political speech. Firstly, that is 
because organizations can engage in speech that mixes its ordinary charitable 
speech with electoral speech without making any (or very, very little) 
incremental or marginal expenditure for the electoral speech. For example, 
an organization that sends a monthly two-page newsletter educating its 
members about environmental issues expends no incremental funds when it 
includes in the newsletter an endorsement of a candidate. But the fact that it 
spends no additional funds to communicate its views does not mean that it 
has not used the government benefit to do so. The existence of its charitable 
newsletter enables the organization to reach so many people with its message, 
and therefore the government has not avoided subsidizing the organization’s 
electoral speech since it subsidized the creation and development of the 
newsletter and its readership. The newsletter represents not just the cost of ink 
and paper and postage (I know, I know; no one sends newsletters anymore), but 
also the mailing list of recipients. For some organizations, the mailing list is their 
most valuable asset, and if it is shared between charitable uses and electoral, the 
 
73 See Leff, supra note 2, at 679–80 (proposing an “expenditure paradigm” narrowly tailored 
to the government’s interest in regulating expenditures). 
74 See Leff, supra note 2, at 677 (“This article argues . . . that the Service’s current 
interpretation of the Ban likely exceeds permissible constitutional bounds.”). 
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electoral uses are subsidized by the charitable ones if a de minimis or marginal 
cost theory is used.75  
Even more importantly, though, is the fact that when an organization 
communicates its support for a candidate, it leverages the value of its 
“credibility.” As I argued previously, 
Indeed, the very concept of an ‘endorsement’ presupposes that 
the listener cares more about the credibility of the speaker than 
the content of the argument such speaker makes on behalf of 
the candidate . . . . An argument could be made that subsidized 
expenditures made by an organization over its entire history 
have served on some basis to enhance its credibility. Whatever 
it has spent its money on, that money has served to enhance 
the perceived legitimacy of the organization among its 
constituency. When it makes an endorsement, the 
organization draws upon this history of legitimacy.76 
Again, if the organization’s electoral use (which the government 
intends to avoid subsidizing) leverages the value created by the 
organization’s charitable use, which has been subsidized, then the 
government has not avoided subvention.  
In other words, CAPRO’s “no-cost political speech” is not “no-cost” 
at all. Thus, the FSFA—because it takes a “de minimis incremental expense” 
approach to measuring the cost of electoral speech—errs on the side of 
permitting too much electoral speech by nonprofits in its attempt to strike a 
balance between the goals of permitting speech and nonsubvention. Of 
course, given the difficulty of a true measurement of the “cost” of certain 
types of political speech, Congress can strike the balance in this way if it 
chooses, but there are critics of the FSFA who believe that such an approach  
would open a gigantic loophole in the campaign finance system, and they are 
seeking ways to limit the impact of that proposed loophole to strike a better 
balance between competing goals.  
 
B. Proposed More Restrictive Solutions 
 
Professor Ellen Aprill has recently published an especially incisive 
critique of de minimis incremental expense approaches to the Johnson 
 
75 In the political context, the value of a “mailing list” (or membership) is even more obvious. 
For example, Professor Brian Galle points out, “political theorists believe that a key source 
of lobbyist influence is the threat, often implicit, that the lobbyist can mobilize her 
constituency to vote against the official she is lobbying . . . . A charity offers the lobbyist a 
built-in grassroots constituency she can use in this way, saving her . . . the costs of building 
a separate organization.” Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1561, 1608 (2013). 
76 Leff, supra note 2, at 713. 
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Amendment, like those advanced by CAPRO and Representative Scalise. In 
Amending the Johnson Amendment in the Age of Cheap Speech,77 Aprill 
argues that “[t]he [FSFA] would have opened the floodgates to campaign 
intervention by charities and encourages the establishment of faux 
charities.”78 Because the Bill permits organizations to engage in partisan 
electoral speech as long as such speech is “in the ordinary course of the 
organization’s regular and customary activities,”79 Professor Aprill warns 
that new organizations could be created that communicate broadly with a 
wide constituency as part of their regular and customary activities in carrying 
out their exempt purpose, and the Bill would permit them to include partisan 
electoral speech (even official endorsements) in all those communications—
newsletters, email blasts, websites, social media accounts, television 
advertisements, paid Facebook or Google advertisements, door-to-door 
advocacy, etc.80 As long as these means of communication are established as 
a customary practice of the organization in communicating its tax-exempt 
purpose, then the inclusion of partisan electoral speech in the communications 
would presumably not add more than a de minimis incremental expense.  More 
importantly, even for established charities, the Internet has provided an 
unprecedented audience at minimal incremental cost. Aprill worries that the 
availability of “cheap speech” through the internet or social media undermines 
any incremental-expense approach to limiting the partisan electoral speech of 
charities.81 Because “[c]harities can have enormous influence on political 
campaigns with little expense in today’s digital world”82 she cautions that “[a]s 
a practical matter, [an incremental-cost approach] will come close to simply 
eliminating the campaign intervention prohibition.”83  
Nonetheless, Aprill acknowledges that we might be moving towards 
the adoption of some de minimis or incremental-cost solution like the FSFA. 
She argues that “[i]f we care about the influence of campaign speech by 
section 501(c)(3) organizations, regardless of the cost, we may . . . need to . . . 
take a different regulatory approach to the issue.”84 Aprill’s regulatory proposal 
is “a radical approach—disclosure of donors, whether or not they itemize, to 
section 501(c)(3) organizations unless they specify that their donations will not 
 
77 Aprill, supra note 5. 
78 Id. at 7. This refers not to FSFA but to provisions in the House version of the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 5201 (2017), discussed in Aprill, supra note 5, at 1, that 
“mirrored” the FSFA and the CAPRO recommendations. See Aprill supra note 5, at 5 (“Their 
proposed legislation resembled the recommendation made in 2013 by the Commission on 
Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations.”). 
79 H.R. 949, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2019). 
80 Aprill, supra note 5, at 8. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 9. 
83 Id. at 8. 
84 Id. at 12. 
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be used for campaign intervention or for lobbying.”85 If donors don’t explicitly 
limit the permissible use of their contributions, then the organization could file 
a statement that it will not engage in any campaign intervention, which would 
keep its donors identities private.86 But if the organization did not expressly 
abstain from campaign-related speech, any donors who did not expressly 
limit the use of their donations would have their names publicly disclosed, so 
at least “voters understand who is funding the campaign intervention to make 
the informed decision that the Supreme Court prizes.”87  
Aprill is not alone in recognizing the problem with “cheap speech” 
and hoping for, or proposing, solutions that would do as good a job as 
possible to balance the recognized need for at least some opportunity for 
electoral speech by charities while simultaneously limiting the harm done to 
the “basic principle” that “only dollars that have been taxed can be used for 
political intervention.”88 Professor Roger Colinvaux believes that the current 
absolute prohibition on electoral speech by charities is constitutionally 
permissible and should stand.89 But he, like Aprill, recognizes that the current 
absolute prohibition may not survive much longer. In a wide-ranging article 
exploring a host of difficulties that would be created if the status quo 
interpretation of the prohibition ceased being tenable, Colinvaux argues that 
a “taxing speech” approach might be necessary to prevent government 
subvention,90 but that “the political activities of charities that did not have 
expenditures directly associated with the activity (such as endorsements, 
which may require little-to-no direct expenditure) generally would not be 
captured [by any attempt to measure the cost of political speech].”91 
Colinvaux argues that the “no-cost” political activity that was permitted 
under this approach, and for which deductible charitable contributions could 
still be made, “likely would be an enormous loophole. Thus, a serious risk of 
charity capture, and substantial revenue loss, would remain.”92 But Colinvaux 
 
85 Id. at 16. 
86 Id. at 17. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. 
89 Colinvaux, supra note 15, at 709. He also argues that if it was found to be constitutionally 
problematic, the prohibition could be shifted from section 501 to section 170, and taxpayers 
could be denied deductible charitable contributions if the organization they contribute to 
engages in any partisan electoral speech. Id. at 744 (“The disallowance of the charitable 
deduction for contributions to organizations that engage in political activity requires a 
distinct constitutional challenge, which it should easily survive.”).  
90 Id. at 753 (“Notwithstanding these objections, of the alternatives to the Political Activities 
Prohibition, a taxing speech approach probably is the best.”). 
91 Id. at 751. 
92 Id. at 755. See also Colinvaux, supra note 14 (warning of “devastating results” that will 
accrue to the charitable sector if the absolute prohibition is replaced with an incremental 
expense approach). 
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laments weaknesses in any other approach that attempts to limit the potential 
damage that will be done if the status quo interpretation of the Johnson 
Amendment is changed to permit partisan electoral speech by charities.93  
Professor Edward Zelinsky also recently acknowledged the problems 
with cheap speech in the internet age, but he has taken a different approach 
in his proposal to limit the impact of loosening the prohibition. He argues that 
the Johnson Amendment needs to be fixed to better balance the constitutional 
necessity of permitting ministers to speak freely from the pulpit with the 
legitimate government interest in “preventing the tax-exempt sector from 
becoming a conduit for tax-deductible campaign contributions.”94 Zelinsky 
recognizes that “[i]n today’s world of the Internet and electronic media” 
internal communications by church leaders can have extremely broad reach 
without any substantial incremental expenditure.95 “Through social media 
and television, a celebrity preacher like Rev. Joel Osteen is regularly heard 
and read by millions each week.”96  
Zelinsky proposes a solution that he argues is more restrictive and 
therefore protects the integrity of the electoral system at least slightly more 
than the FSFA. First he argues that the Johnson Amendment should be 
enforced as currently interpreted against all 501(c)(3) organizations that are 
not houses of worship.97 Second, he argues that houses of worship should be 
permitted to engage in partisan electoral speech but only in “internal” 
communications.98 While acknowledging that the definition of “internal” will 
 
93 Colinvaux, supra note 14. 
94 Edward A. Zelinsky, Churches’ Lobbying and Campaigning: A Proposed Statutory Safe 
Harbor for Internal Church Communications, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2017). 
Zelinsky proceeds to comment that “[t]he revised statute should discourage the diversion of tax-
exempt resources into campaigning and lobbying, while safeguarding internal church discussions 
from church-state entanglement.” Id. at 1547. See also ZELINSKY, supra note 24, at 204 
(proposing a “safe harbor” to protect in-house church communications “from both the Section 
501(c)(3) prohibition on campaigning and that section’s prohibition of substantial lobbying.”). 
95 Zelinsky, supra note 94, at 1548. 
96 Id. at 1549. 
97 Id. at 1547. Because Zelinsky’s major complaint is with church-state entanglement, not 
with general free speech concerns, this limitation to houses of worship seems to him to be 
appropriately narrowly tailored. Since I believe that the primary imperfections in the current 
interpretation of the Johnson Amendment are due to overly restricting speech rights, applying a 
solution only to houses of worship does not solve the problem (and potentially raises new 
constitutional concerns under the Establishment Clause by favoring religious organizations). 
Evaluating the respective positions in this discussion is well beyond the scope of the present Article. 
98 Id. at 1545–51. Creating an exception for “internal communications” only in the context 
of houses of worship has long been a favorite solution for those commentators who argue 
that religious organizations have a special role to play in electoral politics. See, e.g., 
Samansky, supra note 51, at 165 (arguing that, as long as they do not include official 
endorsements, “churches and religious leaders should have virtually complete freedom to 
communicate with their congregations” in sermons and other routine communications); see 
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be strained by the ways that churches regularly project their church services 
to the masses, he argues that his limitation to internal communications would 
be “a stronger barrier against the potential use of tax-deductible donations for 
political campaigning”99 because “[u]nder the [Senate’s version of the FSFA], 
a non-church religious organization could construe its [tax-]exempt purpose as 
including communication aimed at the general public . . . . [which] could permit 
the diversion of tax-deductible contributions to political campaigning.”100 
Zelinsky thus presents his solution as less destructive to the campaign finance 
system than the FSFA, which would create a broader loophole. 
Professor Nina Crimm and her co-author Laurence Winer propose an 
even more restrictive “internal speech” solution to the problem of “cheap 
speech,” attempting to better balance First Amendment interests of 
organizations with the nonsubvention principle.101 They propose a minor 
change to the Johnson Amendment to apply to all 501(c)(3) organizations, 
and a more substantial opportunity for electoral speech that would only apply 
to houses of worship.102 For all 501(c)(3) organizations, the prohibition on 
electoral speech would be removed from section 501(c)(3), so no 
organization would risk losing its tax-exempt status because of such 
speech.103 But the restriction would be added to section 170, meaning that 
any contribution to a section 501(c)(3) organization that did engage in any 
amount of electoral speech would not be deductible for the donor.104 Professor 
Colinvaux also argues for a shift of the location of the prohibition from section 
501(c)(3) to section 170,105 and both Colinvaux and Crimm & Winer argue that 
a restriction in section 170 would be less constitutionally problematic than the 
current one that resides in section 501(c)(3), even though it would prevent any 
 
also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, When Soft Law Meets Hard Politics: Taming the Wild West of 
Nonprofit Political Involvement, 45 J. LEGIS. 194, 228 (2018) (“Churches should therefore 
be allowed to include political messages in their in-person, internal communications with 
their members during worship services.”). 
99 Zelinksy, supra note 94, at 1550. 
100 Id. 
101 See CRIMM & WINER, supra note 24, at 321–52 (discussing the “thorny constitutional 
issues” raised by the 501(c)(3) tax exemption and proposing solutions). 
102 Id. at 322–23. As discussed, supra note 97, I personally believe that creating a more 
permissive regime for electoral speech by houses of worship than any other kind of 501(c)(3) 
organization creates more problems than it solves. But Crimm & Winer make a strong argument 
that houses of worship are unique in material respects that make their case for an opportunity to 
communicate electoral speech to their members stronger. Id. at 325. Treatment of this issue is 
well beyond the scope of this article, but it is sufficient here to point out that (1) a properly crafted 
solution that created an opportunity for all 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in limited electoral 
speech would also solve the problem for houses of worship, and (2) a solution that was only 
available to houses of worship would be controversial. 
103 Id. at 326–27. 
104 Id. 
105 Colinvaux, supra note 15, at 743–44. 
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organization that engages in campaign-intervention speech from receiving tax-
deductible contributions for any of its activities.106 This solution, in effect, 
turns 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in any electoral speech into section 
501(c)(4) organizations, because they are free to engage in electoral speech, 
their income is exempt from the corporate income tax, and contributions to 
them are not deductible to the donor (all characteristics of 501(c)(4) 
organizations). But they would not be identical to section 501(c)(4) 
organizations, most notably because they could retain the 501(c)(3) label, and 
would not need to reorganize or re-apply for recognition of exemption. 
Crimm & Winer then propose a new category of section 501(c) that 
would be available only to houses of worship that choose to opt into it (and 
out of 501(c)(3)). This new category would permit houses of worship to 
engage in electoral speech and still receive tax-deductible contributions, but 
only if the speech occurred “exclusively within the confines of a private 
setting” and “for which existing congregants are the intended audience.”107 
This proposal is a version of Zelinsky’s proposal to permit only “internal” 
church communications, but it is significantly more restrictive than 
Zelinsky’s proposal. Crimm & Winer argue that, under their proposal, 
“[i]ntending to engage, or actually engaging, in external political campaign 
speech would automatically disqualify a house of worship from the new . . . 
(proposed) tax classification.”108 They clarify that a communication would 
be “internal” even if it was made electronically to a wide audience who was 
not present in person, but only if “through means that are not accessible to 
the general public, such as closed-circuit television or a Web site that locks 
out nonmembers.”109 Similarly, a “hard-copy pastoral letter or newsletter” 
could contain electoral speech, but only “if confined solely to existing 
congregants or parishioners in a diocese.”110    
 Crimm & Winer recognize that in the age of cheap speech, purely 
internal communications can become external communications easily by 
being spread through social media or otherwise shared. But their proposal 
includes a requirement that “houses of worship must take all reasonable 
measures to urge their congregations to refrain from disseminating the 
private, internal partisan communications.”111 The houses of worship even 
have an affirmative duty under the proposal to “make such dissemination[s] 
. . . difficult in order to alleviate concerns of complicity or even conspiratorial 
behavior.”112 Crimm & Winer suggest that houses of worship include a 
 
106 Colinvaux, supra note 15, at 744; CRIMM & WINER, supra note 24, at 328, 332. 
107 CRIMM & WINER, supra note 24, at 338. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 339 
112 Id. 
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legend on all such written communications that they are not to be shared; 
presumably, however, they would also be required to use available 
technology to make any videos that include partisan communications difficult 
or impossible to copy or share.113 While they do not discuss it directly, this 
limitation would presumably apply to efforts by any affiliated organization 
to share or spread the message of the church’s endorsement or other partisan 
electoral speech. Thus, a house of worship would not be permitted to create 
(or cooperate in the creation of) a 501(c)(4) or 527 organization that would 
use its own funds to publicize the church’s partisan electoral teaching to a 
public audience. Similarly, if a candidate asked if they could share 
information about the church’s support on their own website or in their 
campaign materials or even in public speeches, the house of worship would 
have to decline. Obviously, a difficult question would arise if members of 
the press asked a representative of a house of worship if it (or its pastoral 
leadership) had a view about the candidates that had been expressed to 
members. Again, presumably the church would have to decline to confirm 
or deny such reports. Because this new opportunity to engage in partisan 
speech is housed in a new provision of section 501(c), the penalty for a 
house of worship that participated in the spread of its internal partisan 
electoral message would presumably be loss of tax-exempt status. 
Professor Samuel Brunson has acknowledged the problem with cheap 
speech and proposed a sort of hybrid approach, supplementing the current 
501(c)(3) ban with a penalty regime that would apply to the deductibility of 
donations to charities that engage in partisan electoral speech.114 He proposes 
that a tax be imposed that takes back the benefit of deductible contributions 
applied directly to those contributors who received the benefit.115 The penalty 
would be a percentage of the deduction that was equal to the percentage of 
the charity’s expenditures that went toward campaigning, if that amount was 
high.116 But, acknowledging that “[e]mail, for example, is virtually costless . 
. .” he proposes that donors to charities that spent little on their partisan political 
speech would pay a penalty based on “a percentage calculated by the size of the 
audience toward which the political speech was directed.”117 The denominator 
or the fraction would be the total number of donors to the charity that year, and 
 
113 Id. 
114 See Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty to Enforce 
the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 159–68 (2011) (arguing for a tax law 
that disallows a portion of donors’ deduction to the public charity). 
115 See id. at 159 (“Instead of penalizing the public charity, the tax law should disallow a 
portion of the deduction taken by donors to the public charity that campaigned on behalf of 
or against any individual.”). 
116 See id. at 160 (“Rather than penalizing the public charity as a proportion of its expenditures, 
the intermediate penalty would disallow a percentage of donors’ charitable deductions.”). 
117 Id. 
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the numerator would be the intended audience. For example, “[i]f a pastor 
endorsed a candidate during a sermon, the people to whom the endorsement was 
directed would be those in the congregation. If a university bought an ad in the 
New York Times, the number of people to whom it was directed would be the 
circulation of the New York Times.”118 If the number of people to whom the 
communication is directed is greater than the total number of donors for the 
year, then the penalty would be 100% of the value of the deduction (in effect 
disallowing the deduction of the contribution to that charity for the year),119 
and the charity would be required to notify donors of what portion of their 
donation is deductible based on their calculation of the penalty.120  
Brunson argues that it is only fair to base the penalty on the acts of 
the charity itself, not of any other entity or person who subsequently spread 
the charity’s message. So, he acknowledges that “[t]hese tests can be gamed, 
of course. A public charity could, for example, send out an email endorsing 
a candidate to a single person, knowing that the recipient would forward the 
email to a much larger group.”121 But he claims that if there was evidence 
that a charity showed deliberate intent to avoid or minimize the penalty, 
presumably for example by using a controlled affiliate entity, then the IRS 
could still revoke its tax-exempt status, since Brunson is not arguing that the 
Johnson Amendment be removed from section 501(c)(3).122 Brunson argues that 
this proposed penalty regime is superior to a regime that applies penalties to 
charities themselves both because it mitigates the problem of “cost free political 
speech” and because it forces the charities to communicate with their donors in 
a way that might incentivize donors to exert control to limit the charity’s partisan 
political speech.123  
 
C. Permissive Expenditure Solutions versus More Restrictive Solutions 
 
The proposed revisions of the Johnson Amendment fall into two 
camps. First, some critics argue that the Johnson Amendment is too 
restrictive of speech, especially the speech of spiritual leaders of houses of 
 
118 Id. at 161. 
119 See id. at 162 (“[T]he intermediate penalty would cap the disallowance at 100%.”). 
120 See id. at 163 (“[I]t would require the public charity to send a notice to its donors 
from the year of the violation, informing them of the percentage of their donation that 
would not be deductible.”). 
121 Id. at 162. 
122 See id. (“But the intermediate penalty is not the only penalty in the IRS’s quiver: it would 
still be able to revoke the public charity’s tax exemption. Structuring an endorsement in a 
manner intended to avoid the penalty demonstrates awareness of the rule and a deliberate 
intent to avoid the rule.”). 
123 See id. at 159 (“[D]onors to the public charity have the incentive to make sure that the 
public charity does not violate the campaigning prohibition.”); id. at 164 (“[I]f its actions may 
increase its donors’ tax bills, violating the campaigning prohibition risks alienating its donors.”). 
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worship. They argue that the Johnson Amendment should be revised to 
permit speech by houses of worship or their leaders, so long as such speech 
does not involve more than a de minimis incremental expense in its 
promulgation.124 This would permit partisan political commentary from the 
pulpit of churches. Second, other critics argue that an incremental expense 
solution, like the one proposed in the FSFA, would open up a massive loophole 
in the campaign finance system, encouraging far too much partisan political 
speech to be funneled through 501(c)(3) organizations, and therefore 
insufficiently valuing the integrity of the campaign finance system. They 
therefore propose solutions that would be less restrictive than the current status 
quo interpretation of the Johnson Amendment, but more restrictive than the 
proposed incremental expenditure solutions like the FSFA.125 
The problem is that the more restrictive solutions do not solve the 
constitutional infirmities of the current interpretation of the Johnson 
Amendment. That does not mean that there is no way to open up the Johnson 
Amendment to more speech, including pulpit speech of ministers, to avoid 
Constitutional issues. It just means that other mechanisms must be used to 
narrow the speech permitted beyond a simple incremental expenditure analysis.  
 
III. BETTER BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS (ORGANIZATIONAL 
SPEECH RIGHTS VERSUS NONSUBVENTION) 
 
In the previous Section, I presented proposals by some Johnson 
Amendment critics to either change or interpret the Johnson Amendment to 
permit more partisan electoral speech than is currently permitted (at least 
theoretically) by the IRS. Other commentators fear that these de minimis 
incremental speech proposals will open to the door to too much partisan 
electoral speech and activity by charities and will therefore underserve the 
nonsubvention principle and undermine the integrity of the campaign finance 
system. In order to critically evaluate their proposals, however, it is necessary 
to draw out the implications of Constitutional arguments that underlie the 
critique of the current interpretation of the Johnson Amendment. In this 
Section, I describe the Free Speech jurisprudence that applies to all charities, 
and the minimal characteristics of a modification of the Johnson Amendment 
that would validate free speech interests and pass constitutional muster.  
 
A. Expanded Constitutional Analysis 
 
It makes good sense that proposed modifications of the Johnson 
Amendment, like the FSFA, focus on expenditures in their relaxing of 
 
124 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
125 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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restrictions on partisan electoral speech. The leading doctrinal argument for 
the constitutionality of the Johnson Amendment relies on a DC Circuit Court 
case that held that the Johnson Amendment (as applied by the IRS) did not 
violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or RFRA. The 
case is Branch Ministries v. Rossotti.126 In that case, Branch Ministries, a 
501(c)(3) church, took out a full-page advertisement in a national publication 
warning Christians that then-presidential-candidate Bill Clinton supported 
policies that were anathema to the values of the church.127 The advertisement 
included an express plea for “tax-deductible donations” to the church to 
support its campaign-related activities, which resulted in “hundreds of 
contributions to the Church from across the country . . . .”128 In its defense, 
the church argued (among other things) that the removal of its tax-exempt 
status on account of the advertisement represented a substantial burden on its 
free expression of religion in violation of the First Amendment.129  
The court rejected Branch Ministries’ argument, stating that the 
church’s free exercise is not burdened because it has an “alternate means” for 
expressing its view on Bill Clinton’s worthiness for office.130 It cited the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Regan v. Taxation With Representation that “the 
availability of such an alternate means of communication is essential to the 
constitutionality of section 501(c)(3)’s restrictions on lobbying.”131 It then 
stated that “the Church can initiate a series of steps that will provide an 
alternate means of political communication that will satisfy the standards set 
by the concurring Justices in Regan.”132 That series of steps, presumably, 
would be for the church to create some alternative organization that is not 
tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3), and that organization would have paid 
for the advertisement. The court then emphasized what was at stake in the 
case by stating, “[t]hat the Church cannot use its tax-free dollars to fund such 
[an alternate organization] unquestionably passes constitutional muster. The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that . . . ‘Congress has not violated [an 
organization’s] First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize its First 
Amendment activities.’”133 Supporters of the IRS’s interpretation of the 
 
126 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
127 See id. at 140 (The advertisement “bore the headline ‘Christians Beware’ and asserted 
that then-Governor Clinton’s positions concerning abortion, homosexuality, and the 
distribution of condoms to teenagers in schools violated Biblical precepts.”).  
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 142. 
130 See id. at 143 (“We also reject the Church’s argument that it is substantially burdened 
because it has no alternate means by which to communicate its sentiments about candidates 
for public office . . . . The Church has such an avenue available to it.”). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 143 (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 548). 
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Johnson Amendment present this holding as validation of the 
constitutionality of the law. 
But the actual operation of the “alternate means” of communicating 
the church’s views was purely speculative in the Branch Ministries case. The 
church had not attempted to use any alternative means, and so the impact on 
the IRS’s enforcement against an organization attempting to use such means 
was not tested in that case. Remember, the point of the alternate means is for 
an organization to communicate its views on candidates without using tax-
deductible contributions to do so. Its views are protected speech, but 
communicating such views is not substantially burdened so long as it has 
some alternate means of communicating those views without “subsidized” 
dollars. This point is made particularly clear in Justice Blackmun’s 
concurrence in Regan, in which he stated:  
It must be remembered that § 501(c)(3) organizations retain 
their constitutional right to speak and to petition the 
Government. Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these 
organizations have over [their alternate means], the First 
Amendment problems would be insurmountable. It hardly 
answers one person’s objection to a restriction on his speech 
that another person, outside his control, may speak for him. 
Similarly, an attempt to prevent § 501(c)(4) organizations 
from lobbying explicitly on behalf of their § 501(c)(3) 
affiliates would perpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations’ 
inability to make known their views on legislation without 
incurring the unconstitutional penalty. Such restrictions would 
extend far beyond Congress’ mere refusal to subsidize 
lobbying. In my view, any such restriction would render the 
statutory scheme unconstitutional.134  
While the Court in Regan was discussing the restrictions on lobbying, 
the logic applies equally to campaign-related speech, as was made clear in 
Branch Ministries.135 A 501(c)(3) organization has a constitutionally 
protected right to communicate its views on candidates without the 
government imposing a substantial burden on it. On the other hand, the 
government is permitted to impose restrictions on how a 501(c)(3) organization 
uses the dollars it collects on a tax-deductible basis, as it has done in the 
Johnson Amendment. It just must be sure that the law permits some alternate 
means for the organization to communicate its views on candidates.  
 
134 Regan, 461 U.S. at 553–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
135 In Branch Ministries, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[t]he Court subsequently confirmed [in 
FCC v. League of Women’s Voters, 486 U.S. 364, 400 (1984)] that [the description of the 
necessity of an alternate means found in the concurrence in Regan] was an accurate 
description of its holding.” 211 F.3d at 143. In other words, the Supreme Court subsequently 
adopted Justice Blackmun’s concurrence’s view of the law as its own. 
Vol. 6:1]         Fixing the Johnson Amendment  
 
 
145 
Current IRS guidance arguably forecloses the use of such alternate 
means, creating a restriction that (in the words of Justice Blackmun) 
“render[s] the statutory scheme unconstitutional.”136 That is because Rev. 
Rul. 2007-41 adopts what I have previously called an “attribution 
paradigm.”137 This attribution paradigm can be illustrated by imagining that 
Branch Ministries had attempted to employ an alternate means of 
communicating its views on Bill Clinton rather than taking out the 
advertisement using tax-deductible contributions. This advertisement would 
have been paid for by an affiliated 501(c)(4) organization, for example the 
Branch Ministries Social Action Fund.138 There is no dispute that such a 
Social Action Fund could take out an advertisement that warned Christians 
of candidate Bill Clinton’s views on matters important to the church, and it 
could even expressly urge readers to vote against Clinton. There are two key 
questions raised by Rev. Rul. 2007-41: (1) could the church directly control 
the Social Action Fund? and (2) could the advertisement explicitly identify 
the church as the source of the communication? For example, could the 
church at a meeting of its board of directors adopt a resolution stating that it 
is the view of the church that Christians should vote against Bill Clinton 
because of his positions on issues important to the church, and then direct the 
Social Action Fund to pay all the costs of publishing the text of this resolution 
in national newspapers? In short, could the church use some alternate means 
to communicate its view on candidates? 
As for the first question—whether a church can control a social action 
fund being used as the church’s “alternate means”—Rev. Rul. 2007-41 is 
arguably silent. The Revenue Ruling does not directly address what the 
directors of a 501(c)(3) may do in their meetings. But prior IRS guidance 
suggests that it is the view of the IRS that such an action would constitute an 
impermissible act of campaign intervention. For example, a 1999 IRS 
educational publication states that the actions of an affiliated 501(c)(4) 
organization will not constitute a violation of the prohibition as long as the 
501(c)(4) does not use the “resources or assets” of the 501(c)(3) affiliate.139 
But it then goes on to state, “[a]n important asset of an IRC 501(c)(3) 
 
136 Regan, 461 U.S. at 554 (Blackman, J., concurring). 
137 See Leff, supra note 2, at 698–702 (arguing that under the IRS’s attribution paradigm, 
“the affiliate-organizations solution . . . is arguably incapable of providing 501(c)(3) 
organizations with a mechanism to engage in protected speech.”). 
138 This fund would have to be separately incorporated and raise all its funds on a non-tax-
deductible basis. It would also have to have some purpose other than campaign intervention 
as its primary purpose, but could engage in campaign intervention activities, so long as such 
activities were small in amount.  
139 Ward L. Thomas & Judith E. Kindell, Affiliations Among Political, Lobbying and 
Educational Organizations, in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 170, 177 (1999). 
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organization is the time of its officers and directors.”140 It concludes that the 
direction of a (c)(4) by a (c)(3) would constitute impermissible campaign 
intervention by the (c)(3).141 An inevitable consequence of this reasoning is 
that discussion or the adoption of an express endorsement resolution within 
a board meeting would also constitute a violation of the prohibition.142 
Furthermore, a prohibition on campaign-intervention speech within a board 
meeting could be inferred from Revenue Ruling 2007-41. Because the 
Revenue Ruling prohibits campaign-related speech by organizational leaders 
at official functions of the organization, such speech may be prohibited even 
at board meetings. Board members are unquestionably “organizational 
leaders” and a board meeting is presumably an “official function” of the 
organization. The Revenue Ruling provides exemplary situations, and in 
Situation 6, it describes the chairman of the board of directors of a 501(c)(3) 
organization speaking at “a regular meeting” of the organization. It does not 
explicitly say that this “regular meeting” is a meeting of the board of directors, 
but such an inference is a fair reading of the text. The Revenue Ruling then 
concludes that such speech violates the prohibition “[b]ecause Chairman D’s 
remarks . . . were made during an official organizational meeting.”143  
With regards to the second question—whether the text of the 
advertisement may contain what amounts to an endorsement by the church—
the IRS is more clear. The text of the Revenue Ruling, taken as a whole, 
strongly implies that the material question is whether campaign-related 
speech may be attributed to the organization, not only whether it was funded 
by the organization.144 Situations 3 and 5—each of which describes the 
circumstances in which the speech of an organizational leader will constitute 
a violation of the prohibition by the organization—lend support to the view 
that a violation occurs when such leaders make remarks that can be attributed 
to the organization. For example, Situation 5 describes a statement that the 
 
140 Id. at 177. 
141 See id. (“[The same] considerations that prevent an IRC 501(c)(3) organization from 
establishing a IRC 527 organization also apply to the relationship between the IRC 501(c)(3) 
organization [and] the political campaign intervention of the IRC 501(c)(4) organization . . . .”). 
142 The IRS has also taken the position that a 501(c)(3) organization may not constitute a 
separate segregated fund under section 527 without violating the prohibition, since the 
actions of the 527 fund will be attributed to the 501(c)(3) parent, even if all funds used for 
communicating the position are raised and spent by the 527 fund. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,694, at 11–12 (Feb. 1, 1988) (noting that section 527 “further states that the 
imposition of the section 527 tax and the ability to establish separate segregated funds do 
‘not sanction the participation in these activities by section 501(c)(3) organizations.’ One of 
the ‘activities’ that is not sanctioned is the establishment and maintenance of a separate 
segregated fund by an organization described in section 501(c) where the separate segregated 
fund conducts activities that the tax-exempt organization itself is barred from conducting 
under the relevant subsection of section 501(c).”). 
143 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1423. 
144 Id. 
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IRS concludes does not implicate the organization. The Revenue Ruling 
states that the statement does not violate the prohibition because the 
organizational leader, a minister, “did not state that he was speaking as a 
representative of [the] Church,” as well as the fact that the minister did not 
make the statement at an official church function, in an official church 
publication, or using the church’s assets.145 In other words, the key 
determinant of whether a violation occurred is whether the views can be 
attributed to the organization or not. 
Situation 5 is especially material to the question of whether an 
organization has an “alternate means” of communicating its own views on 
candidates. In it, the minister is speaking at “a press conference at Candidate 
V’s campaign headquarters.”146 If the organization were to have an alternate 
means of communicating its own views on the candidate’s qualifications for 
office, this is exactly the kind of scenario in which it should be permissible 
to communicate such views. A press conference at the campaign headquarters 
of the candidate is obviously not an official function of the church, and the 
press that will communicate the statement will not do so in an official publication 
of the church. This would be an ideal situation for the IRS to explain exactly how 
an organization can use an alternate means of communicating its views on 
candidates: it may do by sending an organizational leader to speak on behalf of 
the organization at a press conference held at the candidate’s headquarters (or 
really anywhere other than an official function of the organization or at some 
event paid for by the organization). But the Revenue Ruling does not state that 
such a communication would be permissible even if it was attributable to the 
organization. Rather, it states that the statement is permissible, at least in part, 
because the minister “did not state that he was speaking as a representative of” 
the church.147  
The logic behind the IRS’s position is not faulty. As discussed above, 
when an organization endorses a candidate, it effectively makes use of tax-
 
145 Id. at 1422, 1424. Situation 3 is very similar to Situation 5. Situation 13 is also arguably 
relevant. In that situation, the chairman of the board of a 501(c)(3) symphony speaks in favor 
of a mayor running for re-election who is present at a free concert of the symphony in one 
of the city’s public parks. Here, the question is whether the candidate’s appearance at the 
concert constitutes campaign intervention, and the Revenue Ruling concludes that it does 
because the chairman of the board communicated his support for the candidate at the event. 
If a free concert at a public park is an “official function” of a symphony that performs there, 
then the Revenue Ruling is consistent on that point without completely foreclosing any 
alternate means for the symphony to communicate its views on the candidates. If it is not, 
then this situation reinforces the position gleaned by the other situations—that any 
communication that expresses a preference among candidates is forbidden if that 
communication is attributable to the organization, whether such communication uses the 
organization’s funds or not.  
146 Id. at 1422. 
147 Id. (emphasis added). 
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deductible contributions, even if no incremental costs are incurred in 
communicating that message. With regard to the money spent to build the 
reputation of the organization, this is true even if the statement is made in a 
third-party location, like at the campaign headquarters of the candidate. But 
notwithstanding its logic, the IRS’s position renders the statutory scheme 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held in Regan that the organization 
needs some alternate means to communicate its own views regarding the 
qualifications of candidates, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the necessity of an 
alternate means in Branch Ministries.148  
So, where does that leave us? The law (as described by the Supreme 
Court in Regan and reaffirmed by the D.C. Circuit Court in Branch 
Ministries) requires that 501(c)(3) organizations have some mechanism to 
communicate their views on candidates, even their express endorsements of 
candidates, without violating the Johnson Amendment. The leading IRS 
guidance on the matter seems to deny 501(c)(3) organizations any such 
alternate means for communicating their views.149  
 
B. What Must a Johnson Amendment Modification Include?  
 
De minimis incremental expenditure solutions, like the FSFA, 
obviously solve the constitutional defect by permitting so-called “no-cost” 
political speech, which could include an express endorsement by a church or 
other charity. But they go further than is required. They expressly adopt an 
incrementalist way of measuring expenditures, and pronounce all speech or 
action that does not require incremental expenditures “no-cost political 
speech,” and therefore permissible. Nothing in the Constitution requires that 
the cost of speech be defined using an incrementalist approach. All that is 
required is that the Johnson Amendment permit some mechanism for charities 
to engage in partisan electoral speech without an undue burden. This Section 
describes the narrowest possible approach to satisfy the constitutional 
requirements described by the Supreme Court in Regan and applied to 
campaign speech in Branch Ministries.  
The narrowest modification sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
concerns would do at least three things. First, it would affirm the fact that an 
organization has a right to develop and state its own view about the 
qualifications of candidates for public office. This view could include an 
express endorsement of a candidate, or an express statement that a candidate 
does not reflect the values of the organization and therefore should be 
defeated. Second, the modification would clearly state that the organization 
 
148 Regan v. Tax’n With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 552–53 (1983); Branch 
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F. 3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
149 Thomas & Kindell, supra note 139, at 177.  
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may use, at a very minimum, its own meetings of its leadership, including its 
own board meetings, to develop its views and to take official action stating 
such views. Third, it would affirm that the organization is permitted some 
mechanism to communicate its official views to its members and to the 
general public, even if reasonable restrictions may be placed on the ways that 
it makes such communications. This Section describes these three minimal 
requirements of IRS guidance.  
 
1. The Johnson Amendment does not prohibit an organizational 
express endorsement 
 
The clearest violation of the Johnson Amendment under the IRS’s 
interpretation is when an organization expressly endorses a candidate. Many 
proposals for reform of the Amendment have preserved this restriction, 
carving out space for an organization (or its leaders) to speak relatively freely 
about candidates, so long as they do not cross the putatively bright line of 
endorsement.150 As discussed above, there is good reason—because of the 
plain language of the statutory text, the additional elaboration in the Treasury 
Regulations, and legitimate inferences from the plausible intent of the 
statute—to argue that the prohibition does and should prohibit express 
endorsements. Nonetheless, I cannot imagine how the Regan case can be 
squared with that circle. It states clearly that a 501(c)(3) organization has a 
constitutional right to engage in Constitutionally-protected political speech, 
and that governmental regulation of that speech only successfully avoids a 
substantial burden on that right if it ensures that the organization has an 
alternate means of communicating its views. It is not permissible for the 
government to offer organizations 501(c)(3) status conditional on them giving 
up their First Amendment rights. It is not sufficient to say that a 501(c)(3) 
organization is free to forego such status in order to engage in such speech. It 
must be able to retain its 501(c)(3) status for all of its proper charitable 
purposes, and still have an alternate means of communicating its views.151   
There is nothing in Regan to suggest that an express endorsement 
could properly be distinguished from other speech that implied an 
endorsement. Furthermore, there is nothing in Regan to support the view that 
the government is free to place restrictions on an express endorsement so long 
as the organization is free to communicate about issues. 
 
 
 
150 See, e.g., Samansky, supra note 51, at 153 (“I recommend that churches not be able to officially 
endorse candidates and still retain their status as section 501(c)(3) organizations . . . .”). 
151 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
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2. The Johnson Amendment does not prohibit the adoption of a 
resolution about candidates at a board meeting 
 
If Regan protects an organization’s right to speak about a candidate’s 
qualifications, including endorsing a candidate, then the organization needs 
to have some mechanism to develop and solidify those views. Of course, an 
organizational leader could communicate what she thinks the views of the 
organization are or should be without direct board approval. I know of no 
doctrine of nonprofit law that prevents organizational leaders who are broadly 
authorized to act on behalf of the organization from stating the organization’s 
views. But the most authoritative way for an organization to act is through its 
board of directors.152 They have ultimate authority for the actions of the 
organization, and they have ultimate authority to speak in its name. The most 
authoritative way for a board of directors to act in the name of an organization 
is through a resolution adopted at a properly constituted meeting. Therefore, 
it follows from pure common sense that the authority of an organization to 
speak and express its views must include the authority of the organization to 
debate those views in a properly constituted meeting of its directors, and to 
adopt a resolution at such a meeting expressing the organization’s views. As 
Justice Blackmun stated in his concurrence in Regan, “It hardly answers one 
person’s objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside 
his control, may speak for him.”153 The person is the organization. The most 
authoritative way that a corporate person can speak is through its board of 
directors. Therefore, the board must be free to debate the organization’s 
position and adopt a resolution stating its views. 
An adequately revised Johnson Amendment must at a minimum state 
that the board of directors, acting at a properly authorized meeting, has the 
right to adopt a resolution stating the organization’s views on the 
qualifications of candidates for public office, including adopting an express 
endorsement of one or more candidates. As discussed above, Rev. Rul. 2007-
41 does not explicitly state that such actions are prohibited, but can fairly be 
read to imply it, since it prohibits campaign-intervention speech at “official 
functions” of the organization, which a board meeting presumably is. 
 
3. The Johnson Amendment must permit some mechanism for 
communicating the organization’s views on candidates 
 
According to Regan, it is not enough for the organization to have 
political views and to be free to form those views, it must be permitted some 
 
152 See, e.g., BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.6(a) (12th 
ed. 2019) (discussing nonprofit governance principles). 
153 Regan, 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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mechanism to communicate those views. This principle is the one that most 
clearly violates current law and interpretation of the Johnson Amendment, 
since the statute says explicitly that an organization cannot intervene, 
“including the publishing or distributing of statements,”154 and the Treasury 
Regulations expand that concept by stating that campaign-intervention 
speech includes, “the publication or distribution of written or printed 
statements or the making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to 
such a candidate.”155 But whatever form a modification of the Johnson 
Amendment takes, it will need to provide a mechanism for the organization 
to communicate its message if it is to conform to the requirements described 
by Justice Blackmun in Regan. As he stated, “[i]t must be remembered that § 
501(c)(3) organizations retain their constitutional right to speak and to 
petition the Government.”156 One cannot rightly be said to “speak” if all 
means of communication—“publishing and distributing of statements” as 
well as “the making of oral statements”—are prohibited. In addition to 
making clear that an organization is free to discuss the qualifications of 
candidates at its board meeting and adopt a resolution expressly endorsing 
one or more candidates, a revised Johnson Amendment must make clear that 
the organization is free to use some method to communicate its views to its 
members and others. 
Of course, the government has a legitimate interest in nonsubvention 
and protecting the integrity of the campaign finance regulatory regime. That 
interest includes preventing 501(c)(3) organizations from using their own 
money—money that includes tax-deductible contributions—to communicate 
campaign-related speech to the world. Most (or even all) organizational speech 
includes the expenditure of some funds for the reasons described above.157 
Therefore, a modification of the Johnson Amendment can carve out a narrow 
exception to the general rule that organizations cannot “speak” about campaign-
related matters. It can prohibit a wide range of activities that are plausibly speech 
in an effort to prevent institutional funds from being diverted to campaign-
intervention activities. But it must provide some avenue for the organization to 
communicate its views on candidates.  
The mechanism envisioned in Regan and Branch Ministries—
referred to as an “alternate means”—is that the organization would cause the 
 
154 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-1. 
155 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) (1995) (as amended in 2017) (emphasis added). 
156 Regan, 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
157 As discussed supra note 29, an excise tax applies to such expenditures, but it has generally 
been the assumption of most commentators that the measurement of such expenditures 
should be calculated based on “marginal” or “incremental” cost. This assumption results in 
the conclusion that the excise tax is not very effective to restrict speech by organizational 
leaders at official functions. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 15, at 652 (“If the political campaign 
intervention involves little out of pocket expense, the excise tax has little bite.”). 
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creation of an affiliated 501(c)(4) organization, which would then 
communicate the 501(c)(3) organization’s views.158 This particular alternate 
means was forefront in the minds of the Justices in Regan because the 
plaintiff in the case had formerly been organized in precisely that way.159 It 
was an affiliated pair of organizations—one tax-exempt under section 
501(c)(3), one under 501(c)(4)—that engaged in lobbying activity through 
the 501(c)(4) affiliate.160 The organization changed its organizational 
structure, shutting down the 50(c)(4) affiliate, in order to argue that the 
Constitution protects the right of 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in 
unlimited lobbying. It was obvious for the Court to suggest that the 
organization would not be unduly burdened by returning to the structure it 
once employed, since it once employed that structure with apparent ease. In 
Branch Ministries, the D.C. Circuit applied the holding of Regan and argued 
that a similar structure would permit the church to engage in campaign 
intervention speech without an undue burden.161 
Thus, it arguably would be permissible for the IRS to authorize the 
use of that structure—affiliated 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations—as 
the mechanism for a 501(c)(3) organization to communicate its views on 
candidates, including endorsements. So long as the IRS made clear that the 
organization’s views can include an express endorsement by the 501(c)(3) 
organization, and that the organization is free to form those views at a 
meeting of the board of directors (as discussed above), the IRS arguably 
could mandate that any communication of those views to anyone other than 
those people authorized to demand access to the resolutions of the 
organization must be communicated through an affiliated 501(c)(4) 
organization. If the IRS took this position, it would require 501(c)(3) 
organizations to form and operate a 501(c)(4) organization as a prerequisite 
 
158 This requirement that an organization have some alternate means of communicating its 
views, presumably through an affiliated non-501(c)(3) organization, has sometimes been 
called the “Alternate Channel Doctrine.” See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and 
Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 100, 114 (2007) (discussing the Court’s 
analysis of a bifurcated 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizational arrangement). 
159 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. 
160 Id.  
161 The court appeared to be confused about the law that applies to 501(c)(4) organizations, 
stating incorrectly that, “[a]lthough a section 501(c)(4) organization is also subject to the ban 
on intervening in political campaigns, it may form a political action committee (“PAC”) that 
would be free to participate in political campaigns.” Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 
137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, this confusion is not material to its 
holding that the requirement that a 501(c)(3) organization form a 501(c)(4) affiliate is not 
unduly burdensome on its expression of its constitutionally-protected speech rights. 
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to communicating its views on candidates. This burden is not trivial,162 but 
the D.C. Circuit in Branch Ministries presumably believed that it is not 
sufficiently burdensome to cause First Amendment concerns.163  
But it makes much more sense for a modification of the Johnson 
Amendment to permit the communication of partisan electoral speech by an 
organizational leader in some form that balances the organization’s right to 
and interest in political speech with the concerns of the nonsubvention 
principle without necessarily requiring the creation of an affiliated 501(c)(4) 
organization. In other words, it makes perfect sense to permit an 
organizational leader, like a minister, to communicate partisan views in an 
official organizational meeting, like a worship service. It also makes perfect 
sense, and is completely permissible, to limit those communications in ways 
that prevent too much violation of the nonsubvention doctrine and reduce the 
impact of such speech on the integrity of the campaign finance system. It 
makes sense to permit pulpit speech; but it also is permissible to limit the 
impact of the dissemination of such speech even if such dissemination does 
not involve incremental expenditures. 
The primary reason for expressly permitting organizational leaders to 
speak on behalf of the organization at official functions is that such speech 
seems so central to what some organizations do. Religious and educational 
organizations have long viewed themselves as essential to the development 
of values-rich communities, and this view has been affirmed again and again 
over the course of American history.164 Some of these organizations view 
 
162 A 501(c)(4) organization cannot be formed primarily for the purpose of engaging in 
campaign intervention, but rather must be organized and operated for some purpose that 
advances social welfare. So, the burden is not just creating a separate organization and 
maintaining separate books and records but engaging in social welfare activities to a 
sufficient degree that the organization qualifies for tax-exempt status under 501(c)(4). 
163 There are scholars who argue that the Supreme Court narrowed its view of what 
constitutes an undue burden on speech in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See, 
e.g., Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin 
Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 899–901 (2011) (arguing that the Citizens United Court intended to 
limit its concept of corruption to quid pro quo corruption rather than access or influence); 
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens 
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407, 423 (2011) (arguing that Citizens United suggests there must 
be a minimal burden on the ability of an organization to speak using non-subsidized funds if 
strict scrutiny applies). After Citizens United, the Supreme Court might be more sensitive to 
burdens placed on partisan electoral speech than it was when it decided Regan, but a full 
discussion of that issue is well beyond the scope of this Article.  
164 See CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 17 (“[M]any 501(c)(3) organizations have as their 
core purposes making a difference in major social and moral conditions.”); see also Richard 
W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 
771, 780 (2001) (“[O]ur history, traditions, and interminable public debates on the social issues 
are and have always been awash in religious expression, argument, and activism.”) 
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politics as outside their proper sphere, but others see political action as an 
essential component of the worldview that they teach.165 Communications 
that take place at official organization functions may have a central role in 
the organization’s ability to communicate their values to their members, and 
therefore may seem almost sacred (or even literally sacred). When a pastor 
or minister or priest or rabbi or imam speaks to their communities, their 
freedom to speak about the values of their tradition is important to them and 
their members. The idea of the government intervening in such 
communications and shaping what the religious leader says appears 
threatening to the core freedom of those organizations.166 The fact that pulpit 
speech has been at the heart of resistance to the Johnson Amendment is not 
an accident. It reflects deeply held beliefs about the meaning of religious 
freedom and its association with what goes on between religious leaders and 
members in a house of worship. 
Because of this deep association—an association fostered by our 
constitutional tradition—the government would do a lot to affirm the 
independence of 501(c)(3) organizations if it permitted such speech. The 
question is how could it do it without undermining the campaign finance 
regime that does not permit a tax-deduction for campaign-related 
contributions. Could a safe-harbor that is broad enough to include the speech 
of organizational leaders to organizational members be narrow enough to 
prevent the “flood gates” from being opened?  
 
C. Analysis of Existing Proposals to Limit the Scope of a Johnson Amendment 
Modification 
 
Of the proposals examined in this paper, de minimis incremental 
expenditure solutions, like the FSFA, modify the Johnson Amendment to 
permit sufficient speech to meet Constitutional requirements. The FSFA and 
similar proposals do not say anything explicit about permissible activities of 
the board of directors, nor whether partisan electoral speech can be an 
“official” endorsement of the organization. But the FSFA’s definition of “no-
cost” political speech is broad enough to include the components identified 
 
165 See, e.g., Vaughn E. James, The African-American Church, Political Activity, and Tax 
Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 395–96 (2007) (detailing the role of the church in 
African American society as an agent of social change, a force of community involvement, 
and a political institution). 
166 E-mail from Mike Batts, Managing Partner, Batts Morrison Wales & Lee, to Paul 
Streckfus, Editor, EO Tax Journal (Jul. 27, 2016), in Paul Streckfus, The EOTJ Mailbag, EO 
TAX J. 2016-144 (“The content of a sermon or religious worship service embodies these [core 
First Amendment] rights like virtually nothing else . . . . A law that permits US government 
officials to monitor and evaluate the content of a minister’s sermons to determine whether 
such content is permissible is inherently problematic. It is hard to imagine any law that is 
more of an affront to the First Amendment.”). 
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as necessary: (i) that it permits an express endorsement, (ii) that it permits a 
governing body to deliberate and adopt a resolution at an official meeting, 
and (iii) that it permits a mechanism for communicating its views. Indeed, the 
problem with those solutions is that, in their effort to permit sufficient speech 
to charities, they undervalue the nonsubvention principle, and in doing so 
almost certainly will create a massive distortion of the campaign finance 
system, as academic commentators have predicted.167 
So, what about the proposals by academic commentators who seek to 
provide alternatives that value the nonsubvention principle more fully than 
incremental expenditure proposals like the FSFA? These alternative 
proposals provide creative solutions, but in each case the proposal is too 
narrow to adequately value the speech interests and rights and 
constitutionally-protected speech rights of 501(c)(3) organizations. In some 
cases the proposed solutions are also simultaneously too broad to adequately 
vindicate the nonsubvention principle. What is needed is a solution that better 
balances free speech interests and rights against the legitimate interest in 
nonsubvention. 
 
1. Proposals that maintain the status quo interpretation of 
organizational speech for non-church 501(c)(3) organizations 
insufficiently validate speech rights 
 
First, any proposal that applies only to houses of worship does not 
solve potential constitutional problems for other charities and fails to validate 
the speech rights or interests of such non-church organizations. 
Commentators like Zelinsky and Crimm & Winer, who propose a special 
speech-friendly solution for houses of worship, emphasize the special role 
that religious leaders have in communicating about the values and teachings 
of their religious traditions, and how that role makes it especially necessary 
to avoid government interference when such religious leaders feel morally 
compelled to communicate partisan electoral messages to their members.168 
But organizations other than houses of worship also play a role in 
constructing and maintaining the social and moral universe in which their 
members live, and their leaders may feel equally compelled to communicate 
to their members in ways that constitute partisan electoral speech. The 
Constitution protects the speech rights of non-church charities as well as 
churches, and so a solution that applies only to houses of worship will be 
insufficiently protective of the speech rights and values of other charities.  
 
167 See Colinvaux, supra note 14 (arguing that de minimis spending on campaign statements 
will not inhibit a proliferation of political speech by charities). 
168 See ZELINSKY, supra note 24, at 202 (arguing that church endorsements should not be 
treated “differently from other internal church discussions”); CRIMM & WINER, supra note 
24, at 337 (proposing solutions that only apply to houses of worship). 
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There is also an argument that a solution that permits partisan 
electoral speech by houses of worship, but not by any other charity, might 
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by favoring 
religious institutions over all other charities.169 The CAPRO proposed a 
neutral provision partially because of concerns about the constitutionality of 
a church-only one, and partially to vindicate the speech rights of non-church 
charities.170 This argument was apparently persuasive enough to convince 
Congress to switch from a church-specific provision to a neutral one based 
on the FSFA when it included a Johnson Amendment reform provision in the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.171 It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
evaluate the arguments for or against an Establishment Clause challenge to a 
church-specific Johnson Amendment reform, but they are substantial enough 
at least to cause some commentators to argue that any modification of the 
Johnson Amendment should apply equally to all 501(c)(3) organizations. 
Professor Zelinsky proposes enforcing the Johnson Amendment as 
currently interpreted against all secular 501(c)(3) organizations, and so his 
proposed method for limiting the effect of relaxing the Johnson Amendment 
for houses of worship fails to sufficiently protect the speech rights or values 
of non-church charities.172 Crimm & Winer do not propose simply retaining 
the Johnson Amendment as currently interpreted for all non-church charities. 
Instead, they propose moving the prohibition on partisan electoral speech 
from section 501(c)(3), where the penalty for violation is loss of tax-exempt 
status, to section 170, where the penalty for an organization engaging in 
partisan electoral speech would be loss of tax deduction for any contribution 
to the organization in the year in which it violated the prohibition.173 
Professor Colinvaux also proposes moving the location of the Johnson 
Amendment from section 501 to section 170, and he makes a more explicit 
argument for why its placement in section 170 would be less likely to cause 
constitutional speech concerns. Colinvaux argues that “denying an individual 
or entity’s deduction for a contribution to an organization that engages in 
political or lobbying activity has only an indirect effect on the speech, at best 
. . . [and] merely reflects Congress’s decision not to subsidize speech.”174 
Colinvaux, like Crimm & Winer, proposes that a taxpayer who made a 
 
169 For analysis of preferential treatment of religious charities over other charities in another 
context, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the 
Establishment Clause and Should Be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 
726 (2003). 
170 See CAPRO REPORT, supra note 18, at 28–30 (proposing a neutral provision). 
171 See Aprill, supra note 5, at 5–6 (noting that the Ways and Means Committee switched to 
a neutral provision potentially in response to constitutional objections). 
172 See supra note 97.  
173 See supra note 102. 
174 Colinvaux, supra note 15, at 738. 
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contribution to an organization that engaged in any campaign intervention 
during the year at issue would be denied the tax deduction provided under 
section 170.175 While it makes sense that moving the limitation from section 
501 to section 170 “would require a distinct constitutional challenge,”176 a 
rule that denies a deduction for a contribution for any purpose to an 
organization that engaged in any campaign-interventions speech would be 
just as constitutionally problematic as a rule that denies tax exemption to an 
organization that engaged in any campaign-intervention speech. Both are 
constitutionally problematic because the “penalty” for the organization 
exercising its constitutionally-protected speech rights is not proportional. 
Their donors lose the ability to make tax-deductible contributions for any 
purpose when the offending speech may be very minor. The opportunity for 
the organization to obtain tax-deductible contributions for its charitable or 
tax-exempt purposes is therefore offered only on the organization’s choice to 
forego a constitutionally-protected right, which is at the heart of what 
constitutes an unconstitutional condition, just the same as the choice of 
whether to forego the exemption under section 501(c)(3).  
 
2. Limitation to “internal” communications is better than to “no-cost” 
communications, but will easily be abused 
 
“Internal communications” limitations, like those proposed by 
Zelinsky and Crimm & Winer, do a better job of reducing subsidized speech 
by charities than de minimis solutions, but may well still permit substantial 
abuse. At the same time, some constitutional questions may remain. 
Remember, under Regan, the Constitution requires that a 501(c)(3) 
organization be permitted (i) to have a view on the qualifications of 
candidates, even if that view is in the form of an express endorsement, (ii) to 
formulate that view, at the very least for organizational leaders like the board 
of directors to be able to discuss the issue at an official board meeting, and 
(iii) to have some mechanism to communicate its views.177 Internal-
communications limitations appear to satisfy the first two requirements since 
board meetings and other deliberative gatherings would presumably 
constitute permissible internal communications. However, it is not clear 
whether they satisfy the third requirement—that the organization be 
permitted some mechanism to communicate its views. The right to 
communicate the organizational view on candidates might be satisfied by 
purely internal communications, but it might well be reasonable to understand 
that right as including at least some mechanism to communicate that view to 
 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 739. 
177 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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external sources. That mechanism can be constrained to further the goals of 
nonsubvention, but it is possible that altogether eradicating it would be 
constitutionally impermissible. If some mechanism must be permitted, then 
some of the restrictions proposed by Crimm & Winer, like their requirement 
that 501(c)(3) organizations make it difficult to share a video externally of a 
leader making an internal communication, would probably be constitutionally 
permissible. On the other hand, a requirement that all members promise not to 
share externally the organization’s internally communicated views in any way 
would probably violate the organization’s constitutionally-protected speech 
rights or those of its members. 
More importantly, however, is the fact that any internal-
communication limitation is likely to be easily abused, and therefore is likely 
insufficient to nonsubvention interests. Members’ ability to share any internal 
communication through social media and candidates’ and independent 
political committees’ ability to use unlimited advertising dollars to amplify 
internal communications mean that an endorsement or other internal 
communication of support is likely to have a wide public dissemination if it is 
valuable to a candidate. Remember, a 501(c)(3) organization has used tax-
deductible contributions to develop its credibility over many years, and therefore 
its endorsement makes use of government-subsidized funds even if the 
endorsement is transmitted by third parties. Because of the ready availability of 
cheap speech, and because of the potential power of a second-hand delivery of 
speech that is authentically associated with the organization, an internal 
communications limitation advances the nonsubvention principle better than 
a de minimis incremental expenditure solution, but still undervalues 
nonsubvention principles.  
 
3. Aprill’s disclosure proposal is promising, but likely to have little 
effect 
         
 In her article on cheap political speech, Professor Aprill proposes a 
different sort of mechanism to prevent abuse of any future loosening of the 
Johnson Amendment. She proposes that charities that engage in campaign 
speech be required to disclose any donors who do not explicitly prohibit the 
organization to use their contributions for campaign speech.178 This proposal 
is promising because it does not rely solely on attempting to segregate the 
cost of campaign speech. But it is plausible that its effect on campaign speech 
will be limited for reasons described later in this article.179  
 
 
 
178 Aprill, supra note 5, at 17.   
179 See infra text accompanying notes 200–07.  
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4. Brunson’s penalty proposal is promising but too limited  
 
Finally, Professor Sam Brunson has made perhaps the most creative 
proposal, but it has its limitations as well.180 The most creative aspect of his 
proposal is that it imposes a financial cost on donors to charities that engage 
in campaign speech, but the cost is not based on the incremental cost of the 
speech itself. Rather, the cost would be a percentage of the value of the tax 
deduction received by each donor to the charity that year. Under Brunson’s 
proposal, so-called low- or no-cost political speech (speech with no 
incremental or marginal cost), could still generate a penalty that attempts to 
reflect the nonsubvention principle. Here, classic no-cost political speech—
like support for a candidate expressed in an in-person worship setting—
would have a cost. A fraction would be calculated using the number of 
people in the church that day as the numerator and the number of donors to 
the church over the course of the year as the denominator, and that fraction 
would be applied to all tax-deductible donations received by the church for 
the year. So, as an example, if there were 100 people in the audience when 
the communication was made and 200 people donated to the church over the 
course of the year, the fraction would be 100/200 (50%). If one of those 200 
donors made a donation of $100, they would get a letter at the end of the year 
saying that the deduction derived from their donation would be reduced by 50%. 
So, for example, if they were in the 25% marginal tax bracket, their tax impact 
of their deduction would be reduced from $25 to $12.50. Every donor to the 
organization over the course of the year would get a similar letter informing them 
to file an amended return to reflect the reduced value of their deduction. 
The key to the proposal is that the percentage of the deduction that is 
taxed is calculated based on the size of the audience toward which the speech 
is directed, not the cost of the communication.181 If the size of the audience 
to which the communication is directed is larger than the total number of 
donors (which would result in a percentage over 100%), then the deduction 
for any donations during the year is entirely disallowed. This proposal does 
some things right because it avoids the problem of low-cost speech and 
properly links the cost of making campaign speech to the existence of a 
deduction for donations to charity, disallowing the deduction if the charity 
is attempting to reach an audience that is significantly larger than its total 
number of donors. 
The problem with Brunson’s solution is the same problem as with all 
of them: a charity can direct its message to a small number of insiders or even 
a single person, who then is free to amplify the message by spreading it to 
 
180 See Brunson, supra note 114, at 164 (arguing for a tax law that disallows a portion of 
donors’ deduction to the public charity). 
181 See supra discussion accompanying notes 114–23.  
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others. In an age of cheap speech, a charity could communicate its 
endorsement to one recipient, and that recipient could communicate that 
endorsement to millions of others for free through social media. In addition, 
in an age of unrestricted political spending, a recipient of the charity’s 
endorsement could spend an unlimited amount of advertising dollars to 
amplify and spread the charity’s message. Under Brunson’s proposal, the 
charity would incur a cost based on only the communication to the first single 
recipient because it would be unfair to penalize the charity for actions outside 
of its control. Brunson fully acknowledges this problem but argues that it 
would still likely have a significant effect. Its effect would come both by 
providing a financial incentive for donors to attempt to prevent charities from 
directing their campaign speech to a significant audience and, like Aprill’s 
proposal, it forces charities to communicate to donors their intention to 
engage in campaign speech. 
 
IV. SO, HOW COULD THE JOHNSON AMENDMENT BETTER BALANCE 
SPEECH RIGHTS WITH NONSUBVENTION? 
 
A. Non-Incremental Expenditure Tax  
 
Professor Brunson’s proposal for a tax based on audience-size rather 
than incremental expenditure is an example of a non-incremental expenditure 
financial penalty. It attempts to impose a financial penalty related to the value 
of the tax deduction taken for contributions to charities in order to better 
promote the nonsubvention principle in cases of so-called no-cost political 
speech. As discussed above, as a financial penalty, it is probably too timid a 
proposal to really promote nonsubvention because any recipient (including 
presumably the minister themselves acting as a private person) could 
immediately turn around and direct the speech to a much larger audience 
without that second communication resulting in any additional penalty.182  
In 2009, I also proposed a non-incremental expenditure approach to 
promote the nonsubvention principle, while still permitting charities some 
mechanism for engaging in political campaign speech.183 As I mentioned 
above, I argued that incremental (which I then called marginal or de minimis) 
expenditure solutions fail to fully prevent subvention because (i) 
organizations can engage in speech without spending any incremental funds, 
and (ii) an express or implied endorsement by an organization derives its 
value from the credibility of the organization, which the organization has 
spent funds for years to build up.184 In order to more fully vindicate 
 
182 See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 114, at 162 (“These tests can be gamed, of course.”). 
183 See Leff, supra note 2, at 715–23 (proposing a model expenditure paradigm). 
184 See supra discussion accompanying notes 73–76.  
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nonsubvention values, I proposed two possible non-incremental methods for 
assessing the cost of an organization’s campaign-related speech: (i) an 
allocation method under which the cost of campaign-related speech includes 
not only the incremental expense associated with the speech, but also some 
allocation of “overhead” costs based on any reasonable method,185 or (ii) 
what I called a “Lump-Sum Safe Harbor Method” in which an organization 
that engages in campaign-related speech treats a somewhat arbitrary 10% of 
its total costs of operations in the current year as associated with that 
speech.186 In that article, I argued that an organization should be prohibited 
from spending any of its own money (money donated on a tax-deductible 
basis) on campaign-intervention activity, requiring the organization to be 
reimbursed for the cost of such activity—which included both any 
incremental cost plus a proper allocation—by some person or organization 
that does not deduct the reimbursement.187 In other words, even if an 
organization engages in so-called no-cost political speech, like when a 
minister voices a preference for a candidate at a worship service, for the 
purposes of the Johnson Amendment the “cost” of that speech would be 
considered to include 10% of the church’s cost of operation for that year plus 
an allocation of the minister’s salary.188 
While I am still persuaded by my reasoning in 2009, I see now that 
the proposal I made then does not provide the basis for a workable solution 
to the Johnson Amendment problem. But I do think that some non-
incremental expenditure penalty could be adopted that would better serve the 
nonsubvention principle than existing incremental expenditure proposals like 
the FSFA. It would just have to be simpler and more administrable than the 
solution I proposed in 2009, most importantly by replacing third-party 
reimbursements with a simplified excise tax regime.189 For example, imagine 
 
185 See Leff, supra note 2, at 717–21 (supporting a reasonable method to allocate costs 
between lobbying and nonlobbying activities). 
186 See id. at 721–23 (describing an arbitrary method to account for funds expended to build 
an organization’s credibility). 
187 See id. at 711 (describing a simplified allocation mechanism in which 501(c)(3) 
organizations can account and pay for campaign related speech). 
188 See id. at 722 (outlining a basic mathematical formula that could accurately capture the 
cost of political speech for a 501(c)(3) organization). 
189 I.R.C. § 4955 already provides an excise tax regime that applies to “political 
expenditures” by 501(c)(3) organizations, but this existing excise tax on campaign-related 
speech is unable to serve our purposes for at least two reasons: (i) there is currently no 
guidance that applies a non-incremental expenditure approach to § 4955, and (ii) the tax 
under § 4955 starts as a relatively modest deterrent to campaign spending by a charity (10% 
of the expenditure). I.R.C. § 4955(a)(1). However, it then increases in a variety of ways that 
would make the application of the tax to constitutionally-protected speech problematic. For 
example, there is a tax on each “organization manager” who willfully permits the speech 
equal to 2.5% of the expenditure. Id. § 4955(a)(2). In addition, the tax increases to 100% of 
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a new tax that had the purpose of accounting for costs of campaign 
intervention other than incremental costs. This non-incremental tax could 
supplement a solution that prohibits any incremental expenditures by 
501(c)(3) organizations, like the one proposed in the FSFA. So, Congress 
would adopt the FSFA, but with respect to so-called “no-cost political 
speech,” it would impose a new campaign-speech tax. If a 501(c)(3) 
organization made an incremental expenditure for campaign activities (like a 
donation to a campaign), it would lose its tax exemption. But, if it engaged 
in so-called no-cost political speech, it would merely pay a tax that is 
designed to vindicate nonsubvention principles, and no more. The design of 
the new excise tax would be important because it would have to be both 
simple enough for a 501(c)(3) organization to comply with the law without 
an undue burden, and robust enough to vindicate the nonsubvention 
principles without going too far.  
The tax would be designed to reflect the fact that the use of tax-
deductible contributions for political campaign activities creates subvention 
by permitting donors, in effect, to influence campaigns with before-tax 
dollars. Therefore, the tax rate should be roughly equal to the benefit received 
by donors who deduct their donations. The problem with creating such a rate, 
of course, is the wide range of tax benefits received by charitable donors. At 
one extreme, some donors do not deduct their donations at all, and so they do 
not receive any financial benefit from their donation. Taxpayers who do 
deduct their charitable contributions receive a benefit at their marginal 
income tax rate, which varies under current law from 10% to 37%.190 To 
complicate things even more, 501(c)(3) organizations are also exempt from 
the corporate tax, and so any investment income that the organization earned 
avoids tax at the corporate rate, which was 35% until the TCJA recently 
 
the expenditure (and 50% on each organizational manager) if the expenditure is not 
“corrected” within a set period of time. Id. § 4955(b)(1)–(2). An organization “corrects” the 
expenditure by “recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, 
[establishing] safeguards to prevent future political expenditures, and where full recovery is 
not possible, [and] such additional corrective action as is prescribed by the Secretary by 
regulations.” Id. § 4955(f)(3). Obviously, this tax’s purpose is to prevent an organization 
from making a campaign-related expenditure, not to protect the nonsubvention principle 
while permitting an organization to engage in constitutionally-protected speech. 
190 See I.R.C. § 170. In addition to the deduction of the value of their contribution, taxpayers 
who donate appreciated assets get a tax deduction for the full value of the property and avoid 
the capital gains tax, which might be 0%, 15 %, or 20%. When that double benefit is taken 
into account, a donation may save a taxpayer as much as almost 57% of their donation as 
compared to selling the appreciated asset. Furthermore, a taxpayer who makes a charitable 
contribution at death may save the estate tax, which is as high as 40%, although this tax 
applies to only a tiny fraction of all decedent taxpayers. 
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reduced it to 21%.191 Given all that complication, it would be impossible to 
choose a rate that actually equalizes the benefit received by donors. Some 
somewhat arbitrary rate would have to be chosen for simplicity’s sake and this 
rate would underserve the nonsubvention principle for some taxpayers and 
over-serve it for others. I could see proposing a tax at the corporate rate 
(currently 21%), although I believe a rate set at the top individual rate 
(currently 37%) would also be justified. Either would be simple enough to 
administer while also being tied strongly to the principle of nonsubvention to 
avoid claims that they were arbitrary in a constitutional sense. 
Even more uncertain than what rate should apply would be how to 
identify the base of the tax in a simple enough way. A tax “base” is the 
number by which the “rate” is multiplied by to determine how much tax is 
owed. In 2009, I proposed a “base” that equaled 10% of the organization’s 
“total cost of operations” for the year.192 In other words, one would recognize 
that in some way all of an organization’s expenditures serve to build that 
organization’s credibility, influence, and audience. Therefore, to the degree 
to which all of the organization’s expenditures have been subsidized with tax-
deductible contributions and tax-exempt income, they are the proper base for 
the tax. But, of course, the expenditures are not only spent to build credibility, 
influence, and audience. They also advance the organization’s tax-exempt 
mission. Therefore, some fraction must be chosen. In 2009, I chose 10% and 
I see no reason to modify that choice now.193 
The point of this discussion is to argue that the fact that observers 
have generally used an incremental-expenditure approach to understand the 
cost of political campaign speech does not prevent Congress from using a more 
accurate non-incremental measurement. Because of the existence of so-called 
“no-cost political speech”—which has no cost only because of an incremental 
 
191 In 2004, a provision was included in a version of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 
which as far as I know is the only non-incremental expenditure tax on 501(c)(3) 
organizations that engage in campaign-related speech ever proposed. See H.R. 4520, 108th 
Cong. § 692 (as introduced in the House, June 4, 2004) (imposing a tax equal to the highest 
rate of tax specified by section 11(b) on the gross income of the organization for that calendar 
year). At the time of the proposal, the applicable rate was 35%, although it is now 21%. 
I.R.C. § 11(b). The provision was removed from the bill with no explanation by the time the 
bill was “reported” in the house on June 16th, less than two weeks later. As far as I know, it 
never subsequently made its way into any bill. [Thanks to Ripple Weistling for research 
assistance relating to this provision.] That provision would also be insufficient for our 
purposes, since it maintains a revocation of tax-exempt status if the organization engages in 
campaign-related speech on more than three occasions and the penalty does not apply if the 
speech “constitutes an intentional disregard by such organization or any of its religious 
leaders of the prohibition of such activity under subsection (c)(3).”  H.R. 4520 § 692(a).      
192 See Leff, supra note 2, at 722 (noting that the concept of “total cost of operation” is 
derived from Treas. Reg. § 1.162-28(d)(4) (1995), which describes the “ratio method” for 
allocating costs to “lobbying activities” for the purposes of I.R.C. 162(e)(1)). 
193 Id. 
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method for measuring cost—the nonsubvention principle is underserved by 
any tax on political campaign speech that uses an incremental approach. A 
tax on political campaign speech that better serves the nonsubvention 
principle could be devised, and I have presented an example of one.  
 
B. Non-Expenditure-Based Approaches 
 
Just because the current proposals to revise the Johnson Amendment 
are either too broad (FSFA, etc.) or fail to solve the underlying constitutional 
infirmity in the status quo interpretation, that does not mean that there is no 
constitutionally adequate solution that also protects the integrity of the 
campaign finance system better than the FSFA. In the prior Section, I 
described a possible way to provide an expenditure-based tax to better serve 
the goal of nonsubvention, while still fully recognizing an organization’s 
right to expression. In this Section, I discuss three types of mechanisms that 
could be added to a revised Johnson Amendment that would more strongly 
protect the integrity of the campaign finance system than solutions like the 
FSFA would. These non-expenditure-based solutions could be imposed to 
supplement either an incrementalist expenditure approach (like the FSFA) or 
a non-incrementalist expenditure approach (like the one described in the prior 
Section). First, there are “reporting” solutions, in which charities are required 
to report certain information to the IRS when they exercise their right to 
engage in partisan electoral speech. Second, there are “disclosure” solutions, 
in which the organization is required to report information to specific 
stakeholders, or the general public, in order to engage in partisan political 
speech. Finally, there are “governance” solutions, in which charities are 
required to observe some procedural mechanisms to ensure that the 
organization itself approves of it engaging in partisan electoral speech before 
it or its leaders are permitted to speak on behalf of the organization. I treat 
each type of mechanism in turn. 
 
1. Reporting solutions 
        
 Reporting solutions are rules that require an organization to report 
information related to partisan political speech to the IRS, or to some other 
governmental agency. Reporting solutions are similar to disclosure solutions 
(discussed in the next Section) because both require the organization to report 
some kind of information, but the difference is that reporting solutions only 
require the organization to communicate information to the government while 
disclosure solutions require an organization to communicate information to 
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someone else, either a specific stakeholder or the general public.194 The 
difference between the two types of solutions is confused by the fact that the 
primary forms on which charities report information to the IRS are the one-
time Form 1023 and the annual Forms 990, and both of these forms are required 
by law to be made public by the organization. Because of the requirement that 
almost all information on Forms 1023 and 990 is disclosed to the public, it is 
easy to confuse reporting with disclosure in the 501(c)(3) context. However, 
there is a conceptual distinction between reporting and disclosure, and 
therefore it is worth treating these types of solutions separately.  
Reporting requirements for political campaign activity could include 
the fact that the organization engaged in such activity, as well as some 
information about the type of activity in which it engaged. The current Form 
990 already contains a question that asks, “Did the organization engage in 
direct or indirect political campaign activities on behalf of or in opposition 
to candidates for public office?”195 Under current law, a 501(c)(3) 
organization that answers “yes” to this question is presumably conceding 
that the organization has violated the law.196 This question is broad enough 
to cover any speech attributed to the organization that expresses a preference 
for a candidate, including a favorable discussion of a candidate by a minister 
in a worship service. 
If an organization answers “yes” to the question about political 
campaign activities, it is then required to answer a series of other questions 
that appear on Schedule C Part I of Form 990, which asks for details about 
the activity. Part 1-A has only three questions, asking for (i) a description of 
political campaign activities, (ii) an assessment of political campaign activity 
expenditures, and (iii) an assessment of volunteer hours for political 
campaign activity.197 For 501(c)(3) organizations, since political campaign 
activities are expressly prohibited under current law, the answers to all of 
these questions presumably constitute an organization’s admission of 
improper activity, to be accompanied either by an attempt to “correct” their 
error, or an invitation to the IRS for enforcement action.198  
 
194 Some states have sought to have the IRS report donor information to state agencies that 
oversee nonprofits within their jurisdiction, but such attempts have been controversial.  See 
Mayer, supra note 98, at 219 (noting actions by some states to require charitable organizations 
“to submit their IRS-required donor lists to the state agency that oversees such organizations”). 
195 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0047, FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION 
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 3 (2020). 
196 See discussion supra Section I. 
197 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0047, FORM 990 SCHEDULE C POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGN AND LOBBYING ACTIVITIES 1 (2019). 
198 For a discussion expressing surprise that the “Pulpit Freedom Sunday” protesters do not 
use the Form 1023 to get their claims into court against the IRS, see Benjamin Leff, If 
Churches Really Want to Vindicate Their Right to Endorse a Candidate It’s Easy for Them 
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However, if the law were changed to permit so-called no-cost political 
communications, the questions might still serve a purpose—or other 
questions might have a purpose. Since this Section is about “reporting” but 
not “disclosure,” we will imagine that the questions appear on a schedule that 
the organization is not required to disclose to the general public. What might 
be the benefits of requiring reporting of (i) the fact of political campaign 
activity, (ii) a description of the activity, (iii) an accounting of the cost of the 
activity, and (iv) an accounting of volunteer hours devoted to the activity? 
The most obvious purpose of a reporting requirement is that it enables the 
IRS to enforce the law. In most cases, the IRS seeks information so it can 
make a determination of which taxpayers to investigate further. In this case, 
however, the reporting requirement might be used for the opposite purpose: 
to provide a safe harbor against enforcement by the IRS, at least when the 
campaign activity is within permissible bounds or not far outside them. Since 
the definition of Johnson Amendment activities is potentially confusing and 
inherently ambiguous, it would serve both the IRS’s and charities’ interests 
to avoid enforcement except when really necessary. If Congress created a 
stand-alone penalty for failure to report campaign activity, and then the IRS 
took a hands-off approach to enforcement of relatively minor infractions so 
long as they were reported, then charities would be encouraged to report their 
electoral campaign activity without fear of adverse consequences from the 
IRS. Failure to report, on the other hand, would result in penalties. 
If reporting was required and the IRS did not use that reporting to 
enforce the Johnson Amendment, then what purpose is served by a reporting 
regime? The most important purpose for reporting, other than IRS 
enforcement of the law, is that asking a question on a Form 990 triggers an 
internal process for the organization subject to the question. The organization 
must develop some internal procedure to be sure that it has the information 
required by whoever is filling out the form (usually a tax accountant, but not 
always). The Form 990 asks whether the organization has a policy that the 
Form 990 is shared with each member of the board of directors before it is 
filed, and it is considered a best practice for all board members to review it.199 
Therefore, asking about political campaign activity should have the effect of 
 
to Get Into Court, SURLY SUBGROUP BLOG (July 28, 2016), https://surlysubgroup.com/ 
2016/07/28/if-churches-really-want-to-vindicate-their-right-to-endorse-a-candidate-its-easy- 
for-them-to-get-into-court/ [https://perma.cc/T33B-ZG65] (“This is often presented as a 
dilemma for the churches: they want to get in to court, and are disappointed that the IRS 
won’t let them. To me, this public stance on the part of the churches and Alliance Defending 
Freedom seems disingenuous.”). See also Mayer, supra note 98, at 211 (“Interestingly, there also 
appears to be a reluctance on the part of ADF to bring this issue to the courts, as ADF could force 
a court resolution by causing a new church to be created and to file . . . for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
status while revealing its plans to support or oppose candidates from the pulpit.”). 
199 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0047, FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION 
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 6 (2020). 
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(1) requiring the organization to be more conscious of whether and when it is 
engaging in such activity, and (2) communicating at least to its board of 
directors whether it is engaging in such activity or not. Obviously, many 
organizations may still engage in such activity without that information 
appearing on the Form 990, but a modest penalty for unreported activity 
should at least encourage some due diligence in those preparing such returns.  
It is probably the case that the existing questions on the current Form 
990 are sufficient to serve as a catalyst for internal processes that will at least 
make an organization more conscious of the ways in which it engages in 
political campaign activities, and perhaps choose not to do so unless its 
stakeholders approve such action. If legislation were passed to permit some 
sort of so-called “no-cost” political campaign activities by 501(c)(3) 
organizations, the reporting provision could be used to encourage 
organizations to go through a deliberative internal process for political 
campaign activities, even if such activities were permitted because they met 
the definition of “no-cost” speech. It would be essential for the IRS to 
communicate that no-cost political campaign activity, however it is defined 
in the statute, is still political campaign activity for reporting purposes. So, 
even permitted activity must be reported. Otherwise, the reporting provisions 
will have little effect. It is likely that such a provision will only be effective 
if some penalty is imposed for unreported political campaign activity, even if 
that activity is permitted under the revised law. 
 
2. Disclosure solutions 
 
The second mechanism for limiting the impact of permitting 
organizations to engage in partisan electoral speech is to require disclosure 
from them. In the corporate context, scholars have called for disclosure of 
political spending by business corporations for many of the same reasons that 
disclosure might be warranted for charitable organizations.200 I can think of 
two distinct types of disclosure that might be effective at limiting the impact 
of a looser Johnson Amendment. First, the IRS could require that any 
organization that engages in partisan electoral speech communicate that fact 
and certain information about the activity to its stakeholders. Second, the IRS 
could require that any organization that engages in partisan electoral speech 
disclose the names of its donors to the general public. These two types of 
 
200 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political 
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 926–27 (2013) (arguing that SEC rulemaking requires public 
companies to disclose their political spending). See generally DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 
111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing public disclosure requirements 
for individuals, entities, and special interest groups who make electioneering donations to 
specific candidates or political organizations).   
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disclosure requirements are quite different from each other, and may advance 
distinct interests in different ways. 
 
a. Disclosure of the fact of, and information about, 
political campaign activity 
 
First, the IRS could require that any organization that engages in 
partisan electoral speech be required to disclose that fact to its stakeholders. 
This could be accomplished simply by keeping the Form 990 questions 
described above in the portion of the 990 that is disclosed to the general 
public. But because Forms 990 often are not disclosed until months or even 
years after the described activity, one could imagine a more timely and robust 
disclosure requirement, for example requiring organizations to post 
information on their website (if they have one) or to send notifications to all 
members or other stakeholders. These more robust disclosure requirements 
would be more burdensome on the organization and so would need to be 
accompanied by a strong justification for their value.  
Donors are important stakeholders for many charities. Under current 
law, organizations are required to provide certain information to all donors, 
and donors are required to obtain that information as a condition of obtaining 
a deduction on their Federal Income Tax.201 It would be relatively easy to add 
a requirement to the current donor acknowledgement form that addresses 
political campaign speech. If that were the case, it would probably be best to 
keep the communication simple, something like: “This organization has 
engaged in political campaign activity within the past year.”  
The arguments in favor of disclosure are similar to those regarding 
reporting, but they take into account the interests of stakeholders other than 
the government and those persons directly involved in preparing or approving 
the Form 990. In other words, disclosure requirements recognize that donors, 
funders, employees, contractors, beneficiaries, members, parishioners, 
students, faculty, and even the general public have an interest in knowing that 
an organization they are associated with is engaging in political campaign 
activity.202 Based on that knowledge, they may choose to increase or affirm 
their connection to the organization or to decrease or sever their association. 
Donors may choose to donate based on the organization’s political campaign 
activity or choose to refrain from donating. Remember, the information that 
would be disclosed is presumably the organization’s understanding that it is 
 
201 See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) (mandating that a tax deduction over $250 must be substantiated 
by a “contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the contribution by the donee 
organization.”).  
202 See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(proposing public disclosure requirements for individuals, entities, and special interest 
groups who make electioneering donations to specific candidates or political organizations).   
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engaging in permissible political campaign activity, abiding by whatever 
restrictions are included in future legislation. If they were engaged in 
impermissible activity and disclosed this, then the disclosure may result in 
enforcement by the IRS. 
Finally, if an organization is required to identify and disclose such 
activity, even if it is permissible, the organization may be more deliberative 
in choosing whether to engage in such activity. Disclosure gives stakeholders 
an opportunity to attempt to influence the organization if they do not want it 
to engage in political campaign activity. How effective that influence would 
be would vary from organization to organization, of course.  
 
b. Disclosure of donors 
 
A very different type of disclosure would be if Congress required that 
any organization that engages in political campaign activity be required to 
disclose to the general public the names of its donors. As discussed above, 
Professor Aprill has proposed a version of this requirement.203 She suggests 
“a radical approach—disclosure of donors, whether or not they itemize, to 
section 501(c)(3) organizations unless they specify that their donations will 
not be used for campaign intervention or for lobbying.”204 She argues that 
such disclosure serves the same purposes as disclosure of political campaign 
contributors in other legal contexts:  
[P]rompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders 
and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations 
and elected officials accountable for their positions and 
supporters . . . . The First Amendment protects political 
speech, and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to 
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.205  
Unfortunately, a donor disclosure provision, like the one proposed by 
Aprill, is likely to be less effective than disclosure in the business corporation 
context for a variety of reasons.206 Disclosure of all donors to an organization 
that engages in political campaign speech would advance some of the same 
purposes as disclosure of the fact of the corporation’s speech, but not 
 
203 See Aprill, supra note 5, at 16 (proposing a rule requiring 501(c)(3) organizations disclose 
their donors unless said donors specified that their contributions are not to be used for 
campaign intervention or lobbying).   
204 Id.  
205 Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010)).  
206 See, e.g., David Earley, DISCLOSE Act Crucial to Transparency of Federal Election 
Spending, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 23, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/analysis-opinion/disclose-act-crucial-transparency-federal-election-spending [https:// 
perma.cc/GX27-NM3Y] (analyzing the effects the DISCLOSE Act would have on 
organizations if they were required to disclose their donors).  
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others.207 For example, to the degree to which the goal of disclosure is to 
permit citizens to “see whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-
called moneyed interests,”208 it is not clear how a disclosure of a long list of 
donors to a 501(c)(3) organization would do that effectively. The donors may 
have very diverse interests, and the fact that the organization endorsed or 
otherwise supported a candidate is probably weak evidence that the candidate 
is “in the pocket” of all or any of the donors. If the goal is to enable 
stakeholders to hold an organization accountable for its political campaign 
speech, then it is not entirely clear why the stakeholders need to see a list of 
the names of the donors. It is plausible that a list of donors that contained 
amounts of their donation would be relevant, since both stakeholders and 
citizens could then see if an organization is dominated by a small number of 
donors, and that information might be relevant to fully understand the 
political interests of the organization. But absent the magnitude of the 
donation, it is not clear what the mere list of names provides. 
Most damaging to the efficacy of a donor disclosure provision like 
the one proposed by Aprill is the limitation that donors’ names are disclosed 
“unless they specify that their donations will not be used for campaign 
intervention or lobbying.”209 The problem with this limitation is that it 
plausibly renders the whole disclosure provision ineffective. Remember, the 
point of non-expenditure-based regulation of political speech is that the 
existence of low- or no-cost political speech means that an organization can 
engage in quite effective campaign intervention without spending anything 
(at least anything incremental). So, if donors can avoid having their names 
disclosed simply by specifying that their donations cannot be used for 
campaign intervention, there is not really any impediment to them preventing 
their names from being disclosed. Arguably, a 501(c)(3) organization could 
still engage in no-cost political campaign activity, if legislation were adopted 
to permit such activity, even if every single one of its donors had specified 
that their donation should not be so used. At worst, all it would take would 
be one small donor willing to have their name disclosed to avoid the 
disclosure regime for all the other donors. If all of the big-money donors were 
not disclosed, and a few small dollar donors were, that would arguably 
provide as little or even less information about who was influencing which 
politician and vice versa than if there was no donor disclosure provision at 
 
207 For a discussion of the policy objectives of corporate activity disclosure versus donor 
disclosure in the context of state-level regulation of non-charitable nonprofit electoral 
speech, see Linda Sugin, Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4) 
Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 895, 918–25 (2016) (arguing that disclosing 
organizational spending in politics can achieve the policy goals of protecting the political 
process, donors, and voters).  
208 Aprill, supra note 5, at 16 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370).  
209 Id. (emphasis added). 
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all. Presumably, Aprill included the opt-out because she recognized that “out 
of respect for individual liberty and privacy, nondisclosure of contributors to 
exempt organizations . . . has long been a hallmark of our tax system.”210 
Therefore, requiring disclosure, but permitting nondisclosure of any donor 
who specifies that their donation cannot be used for political activity, is a 
compromise between two competing values. Unfortunately, in this case, it 
renders the disclosure regime ineffectual.  
One possible benefit of a donor disclosure regime is that it would 
force donors to communicate with the organization about political campaign 
activities. If the organization was required to disclose their donors’ names 
unless the donor asked for their donations not to be used for political 
campaign activities, then the organization would have to explain that 
requirement to the donor and the donor would have the opportunity to express 
their preferences to the organization. This communication might be 
beneficial, but could be accomplished less controversially by a disclosure 
regime designed to force the communication, as described above.  
It is possible that the true purpose of a donor disclosure regime is to 
simply disincentivize political campaign speech by charities. It is possible 
that organizations know that their donors would prefer not to be disclosed, at 
least in some cases, and so a regime that threatens disclosure, even with an 
ability to opt out, will cause organizations to choose not to engage in political 
campaign speech to avoid upsetting their donors. To the degree to which a 
donor disclosure regime is intended to decrease such activity without being 
designed to advance legitimate governmental interests, it is presumably 
constitutionally suspect and improper. 
 
3. Governance solutions  
 
Because a charity is by definition a complex entity, what it means for 
it to “speak” is an inherently difficult question. This is because a charity, like 
any corporation (which most charities are) can only act through its agents. 
And no single one of its agents reliably acts on behalf of the organization all 
the time.211 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to require that charities follow 
some procedures to make sure that any speech, or specifically its partisan 
electoral speech, is really its own. In other words, one could imagine imposing 
some special rules relating to the governance of a charity that engages in 
partisan electoral speech. This Section briefly addresses whether charities 
should be subject to rules requiring them to follow specific governance 
 
210 Id. at 17. 
211 See Galle, supra note 75, at 1625–26 (warning that a charity’s goals might not perfectly 
align with a political candidate’s platform, thereby allowing the charity’s agents to exercise 
their own judgment in choosing which issues and candidates the charity should support, 
potentially contradicting the wishes of the charity’s contributors).   
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procedures before engaging in partisan electoral speech, and the penalties that 
could be applied for failure to follow those governance procedures. 
Corporate law scholars proposed similar governance rules for 
business corporations following the Citizens United case.212 Recognizing that 
the separation of ownership and control in a corporation causes an “agency 
problem,” these scholars argue that aligning the corporation’s political speech 
with its shareholders’ will is a compelling government interest justifying special 
governance rules that apply to corporations engaging in political speech. While 
charities and business corporations differ because charities do not have 
shareholders the way business corporations do, they do have stakeholders and 
suffer from agency problems that are at least as severe as those that infect 
business corporations.213 Given how important electoral speech is, and how 
potentially closely tied it is to an organization’s core identity and mission, a 
rule requiring that a charity properly expresses its own view, and not the 
personal view of one or more of its agents, seems eminently justified.214 A 
concern for the First Amendment rights of charities should not create a 
situation in which the government empowers the charity’s agents to speak on 
its behalf without the proper consent of the charity. That does not make sense.
 So, what type of procedural rules would best align an organization’s 
speech with its intentions (and what type of penalties would be appropriate 
to enforce such rules)? First of all, one could imagine requiring a charity’s 
board of directors to approve any political speech made on behalf of the 
organization. That would mean that a pastor could not endorse, or express 
views—positive or negative—about a candidate from the pulpit unless the 
church’s directors (or equivalent governing body) had expressly approved 
such action. The organization’s board of directors could approve a leader 
expressing the views using her own judgment about how to apply the 
organization’s values to a choice among candidates without directing the 
 
212 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84 (2010) (proposing a series of rules for “determining 
whether the corporation actually wishes to engage in political speech” and arguing that 
“lawmakers should develop special rules to govern who may make political speech decisions 
on behalf of corporations”); Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and 
Sanctioning Political Spending After Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 
449–50 (2012) (proposing that governance procedures should represent natural persons who 
constitute corporations); see also id. at 447 (discussing the Shareholder Protection Act); 
Shareholder Protection Act, H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring that corporations 
disclose both direct and indirect political expenditures and obtain advance consent by a 
majority of the outstanding shares before allocating funds to political activity). 
213 Galle, supra note 75, at 1625–26. 
214 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 212, at 108 (arguing that legal rules designed to 
prevent the use of corporate resources for speech the corporation does not want to engage in 
would be constitutionally valid, as long as the rules would not steer corporate political speech 
toward expensive procedures deliberately designed to deter corporate speech).  
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leader which candidate to support. Or the board of directors could make a 
decision itself about which candidate best advanced the values of the 
organization. Or, of course, the board could expressly prohibit a leader from 
expressing views that could be attributed to the organization, which would 
presumably include expressing any views about candidates at an official 
meeting of the organization (such as a worship service). The choice of what 
the organization’s position would be with respect to electoral speech would 
be up to the board of directors of the organization.215 
While official board approval seems like an obvious first step, it might 
be insufficient to protect the interests of the organization. Bebchuk & Jackson 
argue that business corporations should be required to obtain shareholder 
approval to spend any money on political speech, not merely the approval of 
the directors.216 They also propose that shareholders should be empowered to 
adopt resolutions about the manner or type of political action the corporation 
may take, permitting shareholders to control corporate decision-making 
about political spending beyond just approving the budget for such 
activities.217 Both of these proposals seem appropriate for charities as much 
as or more than for business corporations, except for the fact that charities do 
not have shareholders. So, if there is to be a rule that some approval beyond 
the board of directors would be required for a charity to engage in electoral 
speech, then the first obvious question is: approval from whom? For some 
charities, an obvious candidate for this role is the “members.” In most states, 
nonprofit organizations are defined as either “membership” or 
“nonmembership” organizations.218 A “member” in these states is anyone 
who has the authority to elect or appoint the board of directors.219 These 
members sometimes have authority to make specific important decisions on 
behalf of the organization—their approval may be needed to change certain 
provisions of the bylaws, or to dissolve the organization.220 So, for 
 
215 See id. at 101 (proposing a requirement that independent directors approve political 
speech by the corporation or its leaders). A rule for charities could include such a 
requirement, but could also forego any “independence” requirement, since “independence” 
has a significantly different meaning in the charitable board context than the business 
corporation context. See Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board 
Independence: Focus on Independent Stakeholders as a Middle Way, 99 KY. L. REV. 731, 
732–35 (2010) (highlighting the legal issues inherent to the IRS requiring charitable 
organizations include independent board members as part of their recent corporate 
“governance initiative”). 
216 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 212, at 98 (“[L]awmakers should . . . require shareholder 
approval for corporate political spending.”). 
217 Id. at 99 (“[W]e also propose that shareholders be permitted to adopt binding resolutions 
concerning corporate political spending.”). 
218 W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, 1 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 9:22 
(2017). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
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organizations that have a membership in this sense, it would be natural if one 
were looking for some authority beyond the board to approve political speech 
to vest it in the membership. But most organizations do not have members in 
this sense, and so a rule requiring members to approve political speech would 
only impact a minority of organizations. 
For many organizations, a suitable proxy for shareholders might be 
some broader class of participants in the organization’s activities. These 
participants might be internally considered “members” even though they do 
not have the authority to elect the governing body, and so are not “members” 
in the legal sense. For example, a church may have parishioners or other 
“members” who are regular attendants and supporters. In some cases, 
members may be required to pay dues as a prerequisite of membership, but 
organizations may have a very wide range of mechanisms to define their 
membership in this sense. One could imagine arguing that this constituency 
should have the power to decide whether the organization engages in 
electoral speech. Especially if legislation is adopted that prioritizes so-called 
“internal communications,” one could imagine the same mechanism that 
defines when an organizational communication is “internal” defining the 
constituency that has the authority to decide if the organization will make 
such internal electoral communications.221 One could imagine adding to 
legislation that permits “internal” communications simultaneously requiring 
the organization to define a “membership” to which the organization can 
make such internal communications and then requiring approval from that 
membership in order to engage in electoral speech. 
Finally, there is a strong argument that donors to charitable 
organizations should be empowered to decide whether the organization 
engages in electoral speech or not. There is an old principle of charitable trust 
law that donors make donations to charitable organizations subject to the 
restrictions found in the organizations’ organizing documents. Because 
501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from engaging in political campaign 
activities under current law, every charitable organization that has been 
recognized as exempt under 501(c)(3) has a statement in its governing 
documents that the organization will not engage in such activities. Some of 
those statements may be drafted skillfully enough that a change in law would 
expand their permissible activities so they can engage in any type of political 
speech that is permitted, but many will not be. Even if the language in an 
organizing document is permissive, there is a strong argument that donors 
have donated to organizations under an understanding that the organization 
cannot engage in political campaign activities. Therefore, there is a strong 
argument that an organization should obtain consent in some form from its 
donors prior to engaging in any such conduct. That argument has nothing to 
 
221 See supra discussion accompanying notes 86–97.  
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do with subvention or fairness in campaign funding. It has to do with plain 
old consumer protection of donors. Donors should be able to choose what 
type of organization they are contributing to and organizations should not be 
in the business of misleading them. Of course, any donor consent provision 
will necessarily apply to current donors, and so will not correct any problem 
with prior donors. A stronger provision would demand some sort of consent 
from prior donors before an organization can change its position with respect 
to political campaign activity. However, a provision that demanded consent 
from prior donors would likely be too burdensome for most organizations to 
follow, and so would have the effect of barring existing organizations from 
engaging in political campaign activities, leaving the field entirely to those 
new organizations created specifically to influence elections that 
commentators like Professor Aprill are most concerned about.222 
However a governance provision is crafted, it will create the necessity 
for an organization to make a clear decision whether to engage in political 
campaign activities or not, and may well reduce ad hoc or unauthorized 
expressions of electoral opinions. If those expressions of electoral opinions—
endorsements or implicit endorsements—are attributable to an organization in 
any way, it is beneficial for them to actually be the opinions of the organization, 
not of some or other agent of the organization. Any church or other organization 
that values its pastor’s or other leader’s views about the qualifications of 
candidates will presumably authorize those leaders to express those views as the 
views of the organization. That right is arguably protected by the Constitution, 
but the Constitution does not protect the right of an organization’s agent or agents 
to express their own views as the views of the organization or in a context in 
which the imprimatur of the organization is assumed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
So, how do we fix the Johnson Amendment? Obviously, the Johnson 
Amendment only needs fixing if it is broken, and so a fix assumes that the 
status quo is not sustainable. I believe that the status quo is not sustainable 
because it unconstitutionally burdens the speech rights of charitable 
organizations by prohibiting them from expressing their views on the 
qualifications of candidates, without providing them with an adequate 
alternate channel for expressing such views. I also believe that the Johnson 
Amendment is broken because the partisan divide over the proper scope of 
the provision has paralyzed the IRS and prevented it from adequately 
enforcing the prohibition even against obviously improper activity. But I do 
not think one needs to be convinced that the status quo is unconstitutional or 
 
222 See Aprill, supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he proposed legislation . . . encourages the 
establishment of faux charities.”). 
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inadequately enforced to believe that the Johnson Amendment needs to be 
fixed. One might simply be concerned that the political forces gathering to 
change the Johnson Amendment are getting closer and closer to their goal, 
and that the fix they are proposing—a de minimis incremental cost approach 
like the FSFA—is insufficiently protective of the nonsubvention principle. 
Even if you believe that the status quo is sustainable as a policy matter, if you 
think it will fail as a political matter, you might be interested in a better fix 
than the leading proposal in Congress. 
So, what are the parameters of a revised Johnson Amendment that 
actually adequately balances the speech interests of charities against the 
nonsubvention principle? First, it still prevents 501(c)(3) organizations from 
merely serving as a pass-through for campaign contributions. That is, the first 
job of the Johnson Amendment is to prevent incremental expenditures by a 
501(c)(3) organization to political campaign organizations or for political 
campaign activities. Those incremental expenditures obviously violate the 
nonsubvention principle and should be prohibited. Second, it would impose a 
financial cost to engaging in non-incremental expenditures—so-called “no-
cost” political speech. I’ve proposed an excise tax of 21% on a base of 10% of 
the organization’s total operating costs for the year. That excise tax would 
cover all of the no-cost political speech no matter how many times it occurred, 
though it would not cover incremental expenditures. Third, some sort of 
disclosure regime should be imposed to require 501(c)(3) organizations that 
want to engage in political campaign activity to report that fact and information 
about how they did it or plan to do it to their stakeholders and to the general 
public. Finally, governance requirements should be imposed to make sure 
that relevant stakeholders have consented to the organization’s exercise of its 
speech rights prior to any political campaign activity taking place. I believe that 
these four requirements are necessary to best balance the speech rights of 
charitable organizations with the nonsubvention principle, and that they do a 
better job of aligning policy with the interests of charities, their stakeholders, and 
the common good than existing proposals that limit the scope of an incremental 
approach by only permitting certain organizations (like houses of worship) or 
certain communications (like internal communications). 
I am not deluded enough to think that the political climate is such that 
real compromise action by Congress or the IRS on this matter is possible at 
the present moment. But I do harbor the faint hope that someday, perhaps 
even in the near future, something in this Article could be useful to actors or 
spectators seeking to steer a middle course between two poles of political 
rhetoric that exaggerate the partisan divide on this issue.   
 
 
